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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

S 14413

checked. The first of these is "an administrative imbalance between our ability to take military risks and our ability to take political risks." The FORUM study charges that reforms in the Defense Department have given military planners a bureaucratic advantage over the cluster of civilian agencies charged with economic and political elements of foreign policy. As a result, "blind bureaucratic momentum" shifts policies in favor of solutions recommended by the Defense Department. This explains why "American policy can drift towards military solutions where political ones will suffice; American youth can die because its elders lack decisive civilian leadership."

"It is meaningless for officials to talk of America's desire for peace and for a 'political solution', so long as administrative means to implement these hopes are not known to exist," the study says. It charges that there has been no public indication of contingency plans for a realistic settlement in Vietnam.

CONGRESSIONAL WEAKNESS

The Ripon study also shows that Congress has been unprepared to check the Executive Branch on Vietnam. "Congress has had neither the staff nor the machinery to assert its prerogatives in the making of Vietnam policy. Its right to be consulted has been compromised into a right to ratify . . . Congress' right to know has been reduced to the right to be briefed."

The Ripon study says that President Johnson has tended to exploit Congress' weaknesses by a style of "secrecy and silence." It accuses him of relying on a "contrived atmosphere of crisis" and of blitzing Congress with questions, "the answers to which are predetermined by carefully controlled briefing."

REPUBLICAN RESPONSIBILITY

Because of the weakness of Congress and failure of the President to reform and coordinate civilian policy-making agencies, Ripon charges that Vietnam policy is made by a "self-entrenching bureaucratic coalition that cannot be reformed from within." It calls for partisan action by the Republican Party to correct the "fiasco" of American policy in Vietnam.

Republicans, the Ripon study says, can grasp the realities of local politics in South Vietnam and need for checks and balances in Washington. It charges that "the best men and the best minds are not making this country's foreign policy."

"In 1962," it concludes, "the Republican Party demonstrated its ability to extricate the United States from a war on the Asian mainland. 'The issue now is whether the American people think our present course in Vietnam is worth more deception, more resources, more lives. If they do not, there is an alternative.'"

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER, Pursuant to the order of Friday, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK], for a period not to exceed 1 hour.

ABM

THE ABM DECISION—A \$5 BILLION INVESTMENT IN AN INEFFECTIVE SYSTEM

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, today I desire to address the Senate on the decision of the administration to deploy a so-called thin anti-ballistic-missile defense at a cost of \$5 billion.

I submit that from the evidence it is clear that this vastly expensive new weapons system essentially contributes

nothing to this country's security. I urge the administration to reconsider its decision, which I believe to be wrong on three counts—militarily, economically, and diplomatically.

The best arguments against ABM deployment has been made by Secretary McNamara himself. The Secretary pointed out in his San Francisco speech that there is no ABM system which can be built—no matter how much we spend on it—which would not be, and I quote the Secretary's own words, "ineffective against a sophisticated Soviet offense." Even if we were to spend \$40 billion or more on a so-called massive system, the resulting increase in our security against a Russian attack would be zero, according to the Secretary of Defense. The result would be a waste of a great deal of money at a time when the war in Vietnam is costing us \$2½ billion a month, when the President is asking for new taxes to offset a growing budget deficit, and our crucial domestic programs are being reduced to support the increases in the military budget. What would we get for our money? A very expensive flying "erector set" which the Russians could easily and cheaply overpower by increasing their offensive missile striking force.

The argument that the so-called thin system is justified by the approaching threat of Chinese nuclear-tipped missiles simply does not hold up. We have the capacity to devastate China many times over if her leaders should be so foolish as to initiate a nuclear exchange with us, and the Chinese know that. That fact is at the heart of the deterrence policy which has guided American military strategy since the beginning of the nuclear age. Our strategy has been to deter a first strike against ourselves by making it plain to any would-be aggressor that our second strike against him would be utterly and horribly devastating. Is there anyone who seriously believes that the Chinese Government would not be effectively deterred by that prospect?

I discussed this subject informally the other day with the President's scientific adviser, Dr. Hornig. After he said he agreed thoroughly that there was no point in building an antiballistic missile system against a possible Soviet threat—in other words, he agreed with Secretary McNamara—I said to him, "Well, if it would not be any good against the Russians, why do we need it against the Chinese?" "Well," he said, "the only basis is that maybe the Chinese are more irrational than the Russians, and, of course," he said, "that is not a scientific problem; that is a question of political judgment."

I think it is perfectly clear that practically everybody except the military-industrial complex, which would profit from the building of this system, is of the view that to build the system against the Chinese, realizing it is no good against Russia, just does not make any sense at all. I think there is no one who seriously believes that the Chinese Government could be effectively deterred by an anti-ballistic-missile system.

The second flaw in the argument is the assumption that a thin ABM system would be effective against the Chinese

for any appreciable period of time. Even if it is conceded that a thin defense system would be effective against a Chinese offensive missile system which was still in its primitive stage, it is obvious that once the Chinese develop their rocket force beyond the primitive stage our ABM system will not be effective. If the Chinese get their rocket assembly lines going, and develop multiple warheads and penetration aids, they will be able to overwhelm our outmoded ABM system just as the Russians could overwhelm it today.

How long would that take? Secretary McNamara pointed out that the Chinese are devoting very substantial resources to the development of both nuclear warheads and missile delivery systems. Every time our experts have tried to predict the next advance in Chinese weapons development they have been wrong—the Chinese have moved faster than we expected. No one can say how long the period will be between the time the Chinese deploy their first primitive system capable of threatening the United States, and the time they have developed a larger and more sophisticated system, capable of overwhelming first our thin, \$5 billion ABM system, and ultimately even a massive \$40-plus billion system.

The third fallacy in the logic is the assumption that even during the so-called "safe period" in Chinese nuclear development, we would be genuinely safe from a Chinese nuclear attack behind an ABM defense. There are many ways of launching a nuclear attack that an ABM is helpless to deter. A Chinese submarine could perhaps deliver a low trajectory rocket which would sneak through our radar screen, just as the Israeli Air Force sneaked through the Egyptian radar defenses. The Chinese could detonate a nuclear bomb underwater near our west coast—again from a submarine, or even from a trading vessel—where the prevailing winds would sweep the cloud of deadly radioactivity ashore. Or, James Bondish as it sounds, miniature bombs could be hand-carried into our cities in suitcases and detonated. If the Chinese are foolish enough to risk the total devastation of their country by launching a rocket strike against us, what is keeping them from attacking us in any of these ways? The answer is obvious—deterrence, effective deterrence of all forms of nuclear assault.

The inevitable conclusion is that the proposed thin \$5 billion system simply will not do the job which its proponents say it will do. That, of course, is bad enough—squandering \$5 billion of the taxpayers' money on a useless system is no light matter. But the problem is worse than this. For there is, as Secretary McNamara said, a "mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry." That mad momentum, generated in part by the decision to go ahead with the deployment of a thin system, is already gathering force, as the Secretary foresaw, and as indeed I warned him in a letter I wrote to him on June 15, 1967, in which I said:

As a practicing politician, I would like to comment on this proposition that the United States should build and deploy a "light" ABM

defense. In my own view, I see no way of holding back pressure for a full or "heavy" ABM defense once a "light" system has been installed.

There is plentiful evidence that the curtain has already gone up on this new tragedy. We are only now in act I, with the squandering of \$5 billion, the equivalent of 1 million jobs under the emergency employment program which I sponsored and which was approved by the full Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. How long will it be before we see \$40 or \$50 or \$60 billion go down the drain in an orgy of misguided spending?

The most painful costs, however, cannot be counted in dollars. They are the diplomatic costs—the resulting increase in tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union which this new escalation of the arms race is bound to provoke. As Victor Zorza pointed out not long ago in the Washington Post, the most likely effect of our decision to begin ABM deployment will be the strengthening of the hard-liners in the Kremlin in their continuing see-saw battle with the more peace-oriented elements in the Soviet leadership.

This decision will not spur the Russians to come to agreement on limiting defensive and offensive missiles. It is far more likely to jeopardize the pending talks and crush the hopes for an arms control agreement which were generated by the Glassboro conference.

The only gainers from our action will be the members of the political military-industrial complex on both sides—in the Soviet Union, and in this country. The Russian generals, their allies in the Communist Party, and the men who direct the Soviet defense industry will gain status and prestige at the expense of their colleagues. Their counterparts in the United States will have something more tangible to show—fantastic profits for the contractors, and new stars on the shoulders and stripes on the sleeves of the military men who will be in charge of the program.

The story is in the stock market reports for anyone who is interested to see. Where is the ABM money going to go? Raytheon, up 4½ to 91½ on Monday, September 18, the day of the McNamara speech. Aerojet General, up 4½ to 33½ on the same day. Strong rising trends have been just as visible in other major ABM contractors—Thiokol, Martin Marietta and Sperry Rand. The vast new defense pork lunch-wagon—maybe the biggest ever—has begun to roll, and the investors on the stock market know it.

Who are the losers? All of us, everyone, and particularly those who will be hardest hit by the fact that money that should be going into the effort to rebuild our cities and heal the wounds in our society—or possibly, if you take a more conservative point of view, to provide the funds which will make a tax increase unnecessary; or, indeed, to provide the funds which, in the long run, might make further tax decreases possible—is being drained off to build Armageddon instead. Americans who will be deprived of a chance to get an adequate education, necessary health care, a decent place to live, a chance for a job, for lack of funds—they will be the biggest losers.

Those higher up the income ladder will be losers because of the increased taxes which they will have to pay, or through the failure to receive the tax decrease to which they might otherwise be entitled. But the real, ultimate losers are every man, woman and child on this planet whose lives are menaced by the threat of nuclear war, and whose only hope for genuine security lies in the amelioration of tensions between the great nuclear powers and the negotiation of effective agreements to halt the madness of the arms race and turn mankind toward the path to peace.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to my friend from South Dakota.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I have very little to add to what the Senator from Pennsylvania has said, other than to tell him how much I appreciate not only the courage, but beyond that, the commonsense that he demonstrates here today, because he has taken on one of the most wasteful and, in my judgment, most dangerous proposals that have been suggested in a long time. I quite agree with him when he says that, far from adding to our security and to the chances for stability between the great powers, the introduction of the so-called ABM system really adds another dangerous new dimension that threatens both our security and the peace of the world.

One of the things that has puzzled me most about this whole discussion associated with the ABM is the seeming paradox between the devastating case that the Secretary of Defense has built against just such a system over the last few years, having added to it as recently as January 25 of this year in his statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on defense appropriations, and the rather strange endorsement of such a proposal the Secretary made in his speech at San Francisco.

I believe if one looks at that speech carefully, 90 percent of it is a devastating, and, I think, unanswerable argument against the ABM system.

Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will yield briefly, I thoroughly agree with him. My heart bleeds for Secretary McNamara, who, as I think anybody who intelligently reads his speech must see, is doing what he is told to do, despite the fact that his convictions are otherwise.

The argument that we are building this ABM system against an anticipated Chinese attack is completely lacking in conviction, as far as Secretary McNamara's feelings come through his actual words.

Mr. McGOVERN. Would the Senator agree that the senior editor of Newsweek magazine, Mr. Edwin Diamond, describes well, in the October 2, 1967, issue of that magazine, what has happened in explaining this paradoxical situation with reference to our Secretary of Defense? He also refers to a column by Mr. James Reston of the New York Times.

Mr. President, I would like to read a couple of paragraphs if the Senator would yield further.

Mr. CLARK. I would be happy to have the article made part of the Record.

Mr. McGOVERN. I ask unanimous

consent to have printed in the Record the editorial entitled, "The Grand Illusion," to which I have referred.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

THE GRAND ILLUSION (By Edwin Diamond)

Secretary McNamara's decision to go ahead with an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system is based on a set of brilliantly reasoned, highly sophisticated, and strongly persuasive arguments. But the decision is wrong, and the consequences of this error will burden every American for years to come.

Instead of strengthening the national security, the ABM decision may well undermine it, for it upsets the present delicate balance of nuclear terror based on the twin implicit assumptions of a strong (four-to-one) but not overwhelming U.S. offensive missile superiority and a modest Soviet defensive advantage. Worse, the ABM move signals another dangerous upward spiral in the nuclear-arms race which may lead to a renewed drive by both the U.S. and Soviet Union to add new offensive weapons to the overkill arsenals each already possesses. Roswell L. Gilpatric, McNamara's own former Deputy Defense Secretary, fears the ABM means a U.S. global strategy based more on conflict than accommodation. The go-ahead, he said, "is certainly a move in the wrong direction."

Let's put these abstractions in concrete terms—and concrete is exactly where we are now heading. At the very least, this new nuclear escalation means the expenditure of untold billions in exchange for a wholly illusory security blanket. Whether the U.S. spends \$4 to \$5 billion for the "thin" ABM system to guard its Minuteman strike force, or \$40 billion for the "thickening" of the blanket to protect major American cities, or \$400 billion to protect smaller cities, the end result will be the same: all of us will still be 30 minutes away from nuclear annihilation.

MOLE SOCIETY

Indeed, with the ABM escalation, the possibility of this supposedly "unthinkable" missile Armageddon is greater, not smaller. All of us have now been propelled by the logic of nuclear events that McNamara grasps so well toward the next era of the atomic age—the mole society where the cities and civilians of the 1980s may have to burrow underground to join the concrete Minuteman silos sunk in the 1960s and the subterranean ABM control centers built in the 1970s.

Unlikely, you will say; right out of some science-fiction paperback. But who would have believed, ten years ago, at the time of Sputnik I and the "missile gap," that the U.S. within five years would possess the nuclear missiles to destroy the Soviet society and population five times over?

What evidence have I that McNamara—one of the most brilliant and dedicated minds in the nation—is wrong about the ABM? What proof is there that the U.S. has embarked on a dangerous new course? The evidence is abundant. Precisely because McNamara has such a firm grasp of the complexities of the age, he himself has supplied some of the best arguments against the ABM and a new arms race. In fact, if an analyst were to overlay McNamara's speech with one of the cryptologist's sheets that cover some paragraphs while revealing others, the case for the present stabilized strategic situation would become compelling.

ACTION-REACTION

First of all, as McNamara makes clear, the U.S. now has "a numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate and effective warheads [that] is both greater than we had originally planned, and is in fact more than we require." This, to use the blunt term, is what overkill means. And over-

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kill, to be blunt again, is the legacy of politically motivated "missile-gap" cries of the late 1950s. The panic button was pushed in the U.S. and a real missile gap did eventually materialize. But as McNamara points out in his speech, this gap favors the U.S. At present the U.S. has 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons in readiness against 700 for the U.S.S.R. The Russian response to this U.S. superiority has been to concede an offensive disparity. In effect the Soviet Union acknowledged that the richness and ingenuity of American technology could not be matched. But it began an ABM system—the Russian military has been traditionally defense minded—as part of what McNamara calls the "action-reaction" of the arms race.

McNamara has been conspicuously worried by this deployment. As he explains it, the offense always has an advantage over the defense and any ABM system "can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending over more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them."

The logic of the situation calls for one of the superpowers to forego the next turn in the vicious cycle of action-reaction. A Soviet McNamara—they have their sophisticated strategists and their war gamesmen, too—might argue that the Soviet ABM deployment represented a limited and measured response to U.S. superiority, a move intended to assure Russian second-strike capability and thus make the Soviet deterrent credible. Why not leave the arms race in this trade-off situation? Why upset the fearfully delicate balance of terror with a U.S. ABM system?

McNamara's answer last week was: because of the looming Chinese nuclear-missile threat of the 1970s. The proposed U.S. ABM system, in McNamara's words, is "Chinese-oriented," designed to deter Chairman Mao or his successors from an attack on the U.S. It is at this point that McNamara's computer logic breaks down.

MAD ADVENTURE

First, if Peking is suicidally mad enough to mount an attack on a country possessing 200 times more nuclear power than it has, then no amount of objective reality in the form of an American ABM barrier can dissuade the Chinese from their insanity. If the Chinese are bent on nuclear genocide, they could smuggle an atomic bomb into San Francisco harbor aboard a freighter and detonate it. No ABM system can protect against such mad adventures.

Second, the Soviet Union can also argue that its ABM is "Chinese-oriented," and merely a matter of insurance against an irrational attack by a country that shares an uneasy border with Russia and is violently hostile to it. After all, the same madness that might lead the Chinese to attack the U.S. might also push Mao over the brink with the Russians. Would we believe the Russians if they said, "It's the Chinese we are worried about—ignore our ABM"? Yet we expect them to believe our ABM is China-oriented.

The truth is the ABM decision was dictated not by strategy but by politics. Computer logic breaks down because men aren't computers; they are imperfect beings shaped by history and emotion as well as reason. There are really two McNamaras. One McNamara coolly attempts to manage the arms race by force of argument and intellect. He even on occasion does the Russians' thinking for them, patiently elucidating the nuclear strategic options available and their consequences in speeches and in briefings held for the press, but aimed at Moscow. The second McNamara is an American, a patriot and a member of the Johnson Administration (just as his opposite in the Kremlin is a Russian, a patriot, and a member of the Communist Party).

It is well known in Washington that Secretary McNamara for months has opposed deployment of the ABM system despite the

urgings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of Democratic hawks and of Republicans sensing a hot campaign issue for 1968. As James Reston suggested last week, the ABM system launched by McNamara is not aimed at blocking the Chinese or even the Russians, but the Republicans. By acceding now to the clamor, McNamara has blunted the GOP charge that he is "indifferent" to the defense of the American people.

GOOD GUYS

Yet, isn't the U.S. asking—a bit illogically—the Soviet McNamara to be indifferent to the defense of his people? More fundamentally, isn't the U.S. saying—also a bit illogically—that when it comes to the crunch, two standards apply: we are the good guys and would never attack first; you are the bad guys and you might attack first, and that is why we must have a four-to-one offensive superiority and defensive parity (at least)—and a lead in whatever else we decide to build.

Last week was the time for patience and courage—patience to lecture the Russians once again on the reasons behind the eminently equitable U.S. plan to put a freeze on all missiles, offensive and defensive; courage, in the words of former Kennedy science adviser Jerome Wiesner, to run the risks of de-escalation instead of the risks of new escalation; and patience and courage to explain to the American people, even in a pre-election year, why the ABM is not good for their security.

Instead, Washington gave us the ABM. By some curious alchemy, the Administration has convinced itself that the thin ABM system doesn't really change the balance of terror: only a thick system would do that. But thin leads to thick. It is all like that celebrated biology experiment: a frog is placed in a tank of water; daily the temperature is increased one degree; the frog exists as always—until one more degree . . . the water boils . . . the frog dies.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, reading from Mr. Diamond's editorial in the issue of Newsweek magazine of October 2, he has this to say:

The truth is the ABM decision was dictated not by strategy, but by politics.

Mr. CLARK. That is entirely correct, in my opinion, and it is bad politics, in my judgment.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Diamond goes on to say:

It is well known in Washington that Secretary McNamara for months has opposed deployment of the ABM system despite the urgings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of Democratic hawks and of Republicans sensing a hot campaign issue for 1968. As James Reston suggested last week, the ABM system launched by McNamara is not aimed at blocking the Chinese or even the Russians, but the Republicans.

If that is true, it seems to me to be a rather expensive campaign expenditure, to spend \$5 billion, to try to defend our party against political charges apparently next November.

It seems to me that, instead of evaluating this issue in terms of what it may or may not do to our chances in the next election, we ought to be more concerned about the security of our country, and the peace of the world and our economy at a time when it is already strained.

Mr. CLARK. I thoroughly agree. I think that if a man from Mars with some sort of a sense of intelligence were to come here and look at what is happening in this country, he would think human beings here were going mad when

we talk about building an anti-ballistic-missile system of this kind to compound the already frightening arms race.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD certain excerpts from the testimony of Secretary McNamara on January 25, 1967.

There being no objection, the excerpts were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS HEARINGS, JANUARY 25, 1967

Secretary of Defense McNamara, on cost: "In this connection, it is worth noting that had we produced and deployed the NIKE-ZEUS system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of \$13 to \$14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the NIKE-X system. By the same token, other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned . . . (page 57).

"Even before the systems became operational, pressures would mount for their expansion at a cost of still additional billions. The unprotected, or relatively unprotected, areas of the United States would claim that their tax dollars were being diverted to protect New York and Washington while they were left naked. And critics would point out that our strategic offensive force is premised on a much larger Soviet threat (the 'possible', not the 'probable' threat); they would conclude that the same principles should be applied to our strategic defensive forces. For these and other reasons, I believe that, once started, an ABM system deployed with the objective of protecting the United States against the Soviet Union would require an expenditure on the order of \$40 billion over a 10-year period. (footnote, page 232).

" . . . if you put these around (deleted) cities, the Soviet planners are going to re-target their weapons to all the other cities, because there is no sense wasting weapons on (deleted) if you have got all the rest unprotected. . . . And the danger to the other cities that aren't protected is increased by the fact that we protect (deleted) and make them less vulnerable and therefore less desirable targets. And that new factor is in addition to the fact that they just have no protection to begin with." (page 253).

Secretary McNamara; on Soviet reaction: "It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side." (Page 59).

Senator DOMINICK. I just want to be sure, Mr. Secretary, that I understand this. What you are saying in this first column is that the Soviets are technically capable of completely offsetting a NIKE-ZEUS system so that it wouldn't be worth much by the time it was installed.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, that's true. They could both technically and financially, because the financial cost of doing this is not in any way beyond their budgetary limits, and not disproportionate to our cost of having put in the defense system. (Page 238).

U.S. Reaction to Soviet ABM: Arms race: "Although we believe the strategic missile programs now proposed will be adequate to meet the threat, even if the Soviet Union were to carry out a full-scale deployment of an ABM system and develop more effective

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ICBM's, we are making a very comprehensive study of a new long-range missile system. (page 241).

"... I have not alluded in the statement to the arms race, although it would definitely escalate, in my opinion, at great cost and no real gain to either side. We are already reacting to their ABM." (Page 252, responding to question by Chairman Russell)

McNamara on ABM defense against China: "It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China. In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not be made now." (Page 60).

Mr. McGOVERN. I will now read into the RECORD two or three paragraphs from that testimony.

The Secretary had this to say:

In this connection, it is worth noting that had be produced and deployed the Nike-Zeus system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of \$13 to \$14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the NIKE-X system. By the same token, other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned. . . . (page 57).

The Secretary then makes some other interesting points that, to me, are very conflicting.

He said:

Even before the systems became operational, pressures would mount for their expansion at a cost of still additional billions. The unprotected, or relatively unprotected, areas of the United States would claim that their tax dollars were being diverted to protect New York and Washington while they were left naked.

Mr. CLARK. The original argument included the suggestion that first 25 and then 50 of our cities would be protected by the antiballistic missile system consisting of the peripheral defense called Spartan, and the spot defense which is called Sprint. The Pentagon was pressured to make the choice of what cities should be selected, and they did issue a list of 25 cities, and then a list of 50 cities.

I was a little concerned at the inadequate protection going to some of the cities in my home State of Pennsylvania. High up on the list was Charleston, S.C., a city with a population in the neighborhood of 83,000.

It was suggested by me—and I was taken to task by the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND] for the suggestion—that perhaps the Pentagon just might have been influenced in choosing Charleston, S.C., by the fact that the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee lives in that area.

I am not imputing motives to anyone. But can one think of the result of the Pentagon being involved in selecting particular cities for defense as opposed to letting it be done by the political agents, the President and the Congress, and can anyone think of what chances he would have to get elected in his own district or State if he did not insist that every city be included in the area? It would run the cost up overnight because of the pragmatic situation I have been talking about.

Mr. McGOVERN. Secretary McNamara in testifying before the committee said:

For these and other reasons, I believe that, once started, an ABM system deployed with the objective of protecting the United States against the Soviet Union would require an expenditure on the order of \$40 billion over a 10-year period. (footnote, page 232)

I can assure the Senator that every Senator would feel the same way. If my State were to be left out of a defensive system, I would feel obligated to do everything I possible could to have it included.

I would not have any great confidence in the ability of the system to protect anybody, but nevertheless with the kind of emotional insecurity that exists, even if there were only some outside chance that we might hit one of these incoming missiles, one would want to make every effort to have his State included.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I point out what I have pointed out before on the floor of the Senate, and what I think is worth repeating.

In the hearings on the antiballistic missile system conducted by the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Foreign Relations Committee, on which subcommittee I serve—and originally in executive session, but later the classification was removed so that it is now public information—all of our experts testified that we could destroy Moscow tomorrow despite its much vaunted antiballistic missile system, and that Moscow could destroy us the day after tomorrow—Washington, New York—pick the city or State. The experts were all of the view that our system would be utterly ineffective even if it were built, because the technology, which I will not attempt to describe in detail, requires that the incoming missile be identified by radar long enough before it reaches its target to enable the antiballistic missile to go up and intercept it in outer space, or possibly very high in space. This cannot be done because the effect of knocking down the first missile is to obfuscate the radar so that it cannot identify the on-coming second or third attacking missile.

Even if that were not true, there are so many devices by which the effectiveness of radar can be destroyed by an adequate offense which is aware of the problem, that the chances of the second, third, or fourth missile not getting through to its target are almost minimal.

Mr. McGOVERN. I know that the Senator, who is an expert, which I am not, has pointed out on the floor of the Senate a good many times how much more economical it would be to increase our offensive power.

Mr. CLARK. Of course, this is Secretary McNamara's deeply held opinion, and he has been overruled.

Mr. McGOVERN. A good many of our armament experts have pointed out over the years that they hope the Soviets would build an anti-ballistic-missile system because they would be wasting their money when, by a much smaller expenditure, we could overwhelm that system.

Presumably, it would work the same way for the other side.

Mr. CLARK. I am sure the Senator is correct.

Mr. McGOVERN. I would like to read

into the RECORD one other paragraph from the article by Mr. Diamond. With reference to the argument that it is not directed against the Soviets, but against the Chinese, Mr. Diamond has this to say:

If Peking is suicidally mad enough to mount an attack on a country possessing 200 times more nuclear power than it has, then no amount of objective reality in the form of an American ABM barrier can dissuade the Chinese from their insanity. If the Chinese are bent on nuclear genocide, they could smuggle an atomic bomb into San Francisco Harbor aboard a freighter and detonate it. No ABM system can protect us against such mad adventures.

It seems to me, considering the state of the Chinese economy today and their missile development, that even if they did have such an insane notion as attacking the United States, that would be the form it would take, using a ship or perhaps smuggling it into the country in various ways and exploding it in one of our harbors or one of our internal cities, rather than relying on shooting missiles, a field in which we clearly have the superiority.

Again, I thank the Senator for his excellent statement today. I agree with every word, and I hope that somehow the wisdom of his remarks will be heard and felt in the executive branch.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend, the Senator from South Dakota, for his support, which I certainly welcome.

I yield to the Senator from Michigan [Mr. HART].

Mr. HART. Mr. President, I, too, thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for speaking as he has this morning. I do not know what the odds are that he will be listened to or that those of us who say "amen" to him will be heard.

Mr. CLARK. We will hope for the best.

Mr. HART. I hope we are not performing a useless function here this morning, because I sense that nothing more important will be discussed today, tomorrow, or any week than the point that the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks to call to our attention. I thank him for doing it.

The Senator from South Dakota made an important point. As I understand it, the offense outraces the defense all the time.

Mr. CLARK. This has been the case ever since the development of—well, I suppose before the development of atomic energy. I am sure I need not remind the Senator of the maginot line in World War II.

I believe the Senator is clearly correct.

Mr. HART. My reason for underscoring this aspect of the matter is in anticipation of a reply that will be made to us by our critics, those who support the program that we are criticizing now. They will say, "So what? When gunpowder was developed, it outmoded the bow and arrow," but our critics will argue, it was known something would come along more effective than gunpowder. Did it follow that we should not have armed ourselves against those who used bows and arrows?

The point we are trying to make is that some major power at some point in

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today's devices of destruction must say, "Let's stop."

Mr. CLARK. "Let's stop and turn around and deaccelerate this mad arms race."

Mr. HART. Exactly. I hope sight is not lost of this point in reaction to our discussion this morning.

Those who propose the limited system and those who stand here this morning critical of it speak in an effort—and it is sincerely entertained, I know—to save lives. Those who want to put up this screen advocate it because, as they say, it will frighten the Chinese, or something, or it will reassure Paris, or it will undercut De Gaulle and reassure Berlin. Many nuances are put into this matter.

Those of us who criticize it say that if we do not stop at this point, how can we look forward to any kind of constructive arms control discussion. If we, given 200 times—or whatever it is—the offensive power in these weapons than has China, now say that we have to put up this limited screen, when can we in logic look to the Kremlin to stand still, when we want them to sit down and talk about turning down the heat in the interest of saving lives?

This is perhaps the most important point the Senator from Pennsylvania seeks to make this morning.

Mr. CLARK. I am delighted that the Senator from Michigan has put his finger on that point. I agree with him that it is very important, indeed.

Mr. HART. I heard a wise man comment that logic cries out against this limited system; that politics cries out for it; that there is no basis in logic for doing it, and there is no political justification for avoiding it. If we take that approach to all our problems, we will be in the kind of deep trouble the Senator from Pennsylvania cautions us against.

Mr. CLARK. I wonder whether the Senator would agree with me that this is not as politically wise as superficially it might appear.

Four or five billion dollars would be taken out of the economy to build this utterly useless antiballistic missile system, and that amount would be added to a contemplated deficit of \$30 billion for the current year. We are unable to devote the resources essential to remedy the plight of our cities and even to stop the riots, if we wish to take that limited point of view, and more and more people are beginning to appreciate this fact. Therefore, the primitive suggestion—I call it primitive advisedly—that the expenditure of this money is good politics just does not stand up.

I may well be running for reelection in Pennsylvania next year. I do not know whether or not I will. I certainly would not have the slightest hesitation in vigorously opposing, during the course of my campaign, the expenditure of this money for such a useless purpose. I have sufficient confidence in the commonsense of the people of my Commonwealth to believe that would be the better side of the political argument.

Mr. HART. I hope that others will consider the point that the Senator from Pennsylvania has made and reject, or at least question, the assumption that it is good politics to put up this limited screen.

I rise to protest the program not in the belief that I am doing something heroic. I share the notion of the Senator from Pennsylvania that there may be no political danger in standing on the floor of the Senate and saying that this program does not make sense. Many people believe it does not make sense, but do not say so.

Mr. CLARK. Those people, in my judgment, vastly underestimate the intelligence of the average American voter.

Mr. HART. I believe that the average American voter will, in his decision a year from now, include this action in the agenda that he will be ticking off. He knows that we have this morning the power to incinerate most of China. He knows that Chinese leadership knows that too. The Chinese leadership will be responsible or irresponsible, and the setting up of a limited screen will not contribute to their degree of responsibility 7 cents' worth.

But it will cost us \$5 billion to start with, and on a bookkeeping basis alone, that makes no sense at all. The Russians put up ABM screens around several of their cities. The United States would now put up a thin screen to protect, it is said, against China in the next few years. On it goes with each step calling forth greater and newer offensive weapon development, outmoding the screens calling for still more screens. The way to save lives is for turning down, not up, and this moment in arms control negotiations calls for us to turn down—or at least not turn up—this ABM screen.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator is correct. I certainly welcome his support.

Mr. President, the press in many areas has been quite incisive in its analysis of the futility and, indeed, the folly of the decision to deploy an antiballistic missile system.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks a number of press articles relating to this subject. They are as follows:

The first is an article entitled "Allies Foresee New Danger—Europe Suspects Thin ABM Is Step to Massive System," written by Murray Marder, the well-known news analyst, and published in the Washington Post for today, October 9, 1967.

Second, an editorial entitled "Genie Out of the Bottle," published in the New York Times of September 20, 1967. The editorial takes the position that the decision is unsound.

Third, an editorial entitled "The Wrong Race," published in the Washington Post of September 19, 1967. The editorial quotes Secretary of Defense McNamara as saying:

There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry.

Fourth, an article entitled "In the Nation: A Nightmare Debate," written by Tom Wicker, and published in the New York Times of September 19, 1967.

Fifth, an editorial entitled "An Omniscient Decision," published in the Providence Journal of September 20, 1967.

Sixth, an article entitled "A Defense Policy and New Dangers," written by Adam Yarmolinsky, and published in the Washington Post of September 28,

1967. Mr. Yarmolinsky was formerly special assistant to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and is currently a professor of law at Harvard University.

Seventh, an article entitled "State of Affairs," written by Clayton Fritchey, and released on September 25, 1967, by the syndicate which publishes Mr. Fritchey's able column.

Eighth, an article entitled "New Soviet Crisis Seen Over U.S. Missile Plan," written by Victor Zorza, who writes for the Manchester Guardian. The article is the first in a series and was reprinted in the Washington Post of September 20, 1967.

Ninth, an article published in the New Yorker magazine of September 30, 1967. It is the first item in the column, "The Talk of the Town," which is always at the front of that brilliant weekly.

Mr. President, I believe that these statements of the press represent the most intelligent public reaction to this decision. I hope that they will be read most carefully by all readers of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Pennsylvania?

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1967]
ALLIES FORESEE NEW DANGER—EUROPE SUSPECTS THIN ABM IS STEP TO MASSIVE SYSTEM

(By Murray Marder)

A rumble of suspicion is spreading in Western Europe about the intentions behind the "light" anti-missile system announced by the United States last month.

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, in unveiling the \$6 billion project on Sept. 18, stressed that it was solely designed "to deter China from nuclear blackmail." A McNamara deputy, Assistant Secretary Paul C. Warnke, on Friday publicly underscored that limited objective.

Many European experts (and some American specialists as well) suspect, however, that the limited "China-oriented" anti-ballistic missile plan is the first step toward what the Johnson Administration adamantly insists it is not:

An ultimate, massive ABM system to try to ward off danger of a Soviet missile attack, matched by an equally massive Russian deployment to protect Soviet territory.

It is McNamara's determined desire, which Warnke reiterated for the Johnson Administration, to avoid that kind of an outcome by getting Soviet agreement to limit a missile race spiral. But the skeptics maintain that the U.S. foot has now joined the Soviet foot on the escalator.

The suspicion in Europe and elsewhere about the end result is not directed so much at McNamara's or the Administration's desires or objectives, but at their ability to accomplish them.

Despite Administration denials, the skeptics attribute the U.S. decision to launch a limited ABM system to internal political-military-industrial pressures in the United States, rather than to planned defense objectives. These pressures, they believe, will drive the United States into just the anti-missile race the Administration is pledged to endeavor to escape.

An advance guard of Western Europeans is beginning to worry if this will leave their security more dependent than ever on the two superpowers. They fear that Western Europe may be exposed to new danger as the United States and the Soviet Union mutually reinforce their own defenses.

What is potentially more troublesome for the two nuclear giants is that Western Eu-

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rope's leaders are far readier than ever to challenge Washington-Moscow decisions that affect their fate. Moreover, they have opportunity to do so by footdragging on something that the superpowers want—the pending treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SYSTEMS

So far, the relatively few Europeans who have come to grips with the anti-missile problem are divided on the effectiveness of ABM systems and their impact on Europe. But even if their thinking does not coalesce, it can still mean grief for Washington particularly and for the North Atlantic Alliance.

At Ankara, Turkey, in a Sept. 28-29 meeting of the seven-nation Allied Nuclear Planning Group, McNamara succeeded in mollifying Western defense ministers about the American decision of Sept. 18 to deploy a "light" ABM system. It was sprung upon them with short notice, and no consultation, even though Britain had been scheduled since April to report at the meeting on the ramifications of a possible anti-missile system for Western Europe.

Once again, McNamara's dazzling style of showering statistics and rationales on skeptics apparently was effective. But past performance shows that this technique often only suppresses doubt, without eliminating it. There are some indications that a "morning after" reaction already is developing.

Inquiries by The Washington Post in Western European capitals show there is widespread belief that political factors produced the U.S. decision of Sept. 18 for a limited ABM deployment.

SUSPICION AROUSED

This conviction, in turn, has aroused European suspicion that political and "military-industrial" forces inside the United States will, in turn, push it into massive ABM deployment, over McNamara's opposition, if necessary. McNamara has insisted that the result would be only a mutually-offsetting expenditure of about \$40 billion each for the Soviet Union and the United States, without any gain in security, because each nation's offense could penetrate the other's defense.

According to American sources, the political suspicion is correct so far as the timing of the Johnson Administration's Sept. 18 decision was concerned. The Administration, inevitably, has denied that politics influenced its decision in any way.

The United States, in the absence of Soviet readiness to begin talks on limiting nuclear missilery, was originally headed, according to unofficial sources, toward a December announcement of a "light" ABM deployment.

President Johnson, however, confronted with soaring Congressional opposition on all fronts, suddenly accelerated the ABM timetable in an effort to ease the political pressures upon him, according to informed sources.

HEARINGS PLANNED

Among the President's typically multiple objectives, it is said, was a desire to outflank zealous pro-ABM forces in hearings planned by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), plus an attempt to solicit support for the President's stymied tax increase proposal from pro-ABM members of Congress.

The ABM announcement was geared to help counter charges from hawks on Vietnam policy that the administration additionally was risking the Nation's defenses by avoiding any ABM deployment.

A blanket denial that any "Outside and unrelated pressures" influenced the Administration's ABM decision was newly made Friday by Assistant Defense Secretary Warnke. The "decision to deploy," he said in a major Administration speech, "resulted solely from a careful consideration of the security interests of the United States and its Allies."

The "Chinese-oriented ABM system," said Warnke, was carefully designed to avoid triggering "an acceleration of the strategic arms race with the Soviet Union." By building protection against the outside possibility that "the Chinese leadership might panic and press the button," he said, the United States sought to remove doubts among Asians who ask, "for example, if the United States would really be willing to risk Detroit to save a small Asian nation."

NUCLEAR TREATY

Special concern, said Warnke, was given to the question of whether this thin ABM deployment might impair American-Soviet efforts to achieve a treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. "We came to the conclusion," he said, "that our Chinese-oriented ABM deployment should make it easier, and not harder, for countries in Asia to sign the NPT (non-proliferation treaty)."

No attempt, however, was made to make the same claim where the Europeans are concerned. The decision, in fact, has had the reverse effect there.

To the Western Europeans, China is very remote, its potential physical threat to them is remote, and extra suspicion therefore falls on the U.S. decision.

Western Europeans, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and their own security, automatically interpreted the U.S. decision in that dimension.

What looms in West Germany's official concern is that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that the Soviet Union and the United States are urging it to participate in, might preclude a Western European anti-missile systems, because an ABM system employs nuclear warheads to knock down incoming missiles.

REACTION IN BONN

From Bonn, Dan Morgan of The Washington Post Foreign Service reported that the American ABM decision has further undermined the credibility of U.S. intentions about the nuclear treaty. Some Germans are contending that the U.S. action has cast doubt on the stability of the existing nuclear "balance of terror," and that the whole structure of defense concepts may require reexamination.

But paradoxically, the British position, as stated at Scarborough, England, last week by Defense Minister Denis Healey is that: "There is no evidence whatsoever that any ABM system of which we have any knowledge today will produce a meaningful deterrent against a major nuclear power."

Healey expressed a similar position in private talks at Ankara with defense ministers of the United States, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Canada and the Netherlands.

There the defense chiefs discussed, inconclusively, whether any anti-missile system could be effective against the seven or eight hundred Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles targeted on Western Europe. The shorter range makes the problem technologically different from countering missiles fired between continents. Beyond that, Europe's close, crowded cities compound the problem of operating separate, national systems. The alternative, a multinational anti-missile system, raises the familiar nuclear force dilemma of who will pay for it, and more importantly, whose finger will be on the trigger.

EFFICACY DISPUTED

At the top, official level in Britain, the Washington Post bureau in London reported, one source said he accepts the American word that its limited ABM is directed at China and not against Russia. But he disputed the efficacy of that system and expressed belief it was adopted only because of intense political pressure in the United States.

An American counter-argument in this debate which is carried on largely behind the scenes, is this: Britain cannot admit that any ABM system is effective, for to do so would be to nullify Britain's own limited nuclear offensive force.

From Paris, Don Louchheim of The Washington Post Foreign Service reported that French officials are having a field day with the disquiet caused by the American decision.

"Predictably," he reported, the French "see a new vindication for their policy of disengagement from the Atlantic Alliance," and are "playing up the fact that there was little or no consultation before the decision."

"Some Frenchmen have even suggested that by creating an anti-missile barrier in the United States, Washington has made Europe more vulnerable, as a common enemy might prefer to send its nuclear weapons toward undefended targets."

REAFFIRMING THEMES

"The French, therefore, are quietly capitalizing on the ABM decision to reaffirm their thesis that 1. Europe must fend for itself; 2. A separate French nuclear force is more necessary than ever, and 3. NATO is for all practical purposes an American pawn, where Washington calls the tune unilaterally and everyone must dance to it, whether they agree or not."

Gen. Pierre Gallois and other French nuclear strategists maintain that the limited French nuclear force, delivering weapons by low-flying supersonic planes, can elude any anti-missile defense. The French contend, Louchheim reported, that at comparatively low cost, new attack systems can be devised, rendering each new defensive screen a costly anachronism.

By uninterested timing, the new ABM debate inside the Alliance coincides with a conference in Ditchley, England, this week on proposals for modernizing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to cope with the problems of the future.

Deputy Under Secretary of State Foy D. Kohler heads one of four subcommittees that will coordinate their private reports in a study initiated last year by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. These projections are scheduled to be presented to the NATO foreign ministers at their December meeting in Brussels.

The specific subject of a possible ABM system for Western Europe, however, presently is not scheduled for further major discussions until a spring meeting in The Hague of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. These additional studies were requested, at Ankara, by West Germany and Italy. But inevitably the ABM dilemma for Western Europe can recur and rebound almost anywhere in Europe.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 20 1967]

GENIE OUT OF THE BOTTLE

Secretary McNamara's San Francisco speech was evidently a replay of his brilliantly reasoned, impassioned appeal to Premier Kosygin at Glassboro to halt a dangerous new round in the strategic nuclear arms race.

Between these two speeches there intervened President Johnson's decision to build a "light" anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system, probably designed for defense against the Republicans as much as against the Communist Chinese. The question now is whether this secondary decision, taken on what Mr. McNamara called "marginal grounds" will thwart the country's major security objective: to get the arms race under control. We do not think this will advance it.

Mr. Johnson has thrown a \$5-billion fish to the cats. Will it quiet the country's military-industrial complex and its Congressional spokesmen? Or will construction of the proposed ABM defense lead to irresistible political pressure to build a \$40-billion defense program for 25 cities, then fifty or more? The initial indications are that the advocates of heavy anti-missile defenses will not be appeased.

The illusory argument that population will be truly protected by ABM's and casualties reduced has a political appeal that the coun-

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ter arguments, for all their logic, cannot match. The fact tends to get lost that offense always outruns the defense and that both the Soviet Union and the United States can build sufficient weapons to overwhelm the other's ABM system.

The probable effect on this country—a vast and essentially useless escalation of armaments expenditure in money and resources—is bad enough; even more dangerous is the likely effect on Russia.

"The Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans," Mr. McNamara points out. "Actions—or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race."

The Soviet Union may be reasonably sure that the current American intention is not to go beyond a defense against the relatively weak Chinese threat; but they also know that present American intentions could change and that there are domestic American political pressures which prove especially effective every two years as elections approach. Thus what appears clear to Americans—that the ABM system is in fact being built primarily to cope with China—may not appear so clear to Russians. And if they act according to their fears, as they usually do, the race will be on again.

The irony in the decision to go ahead at this point with anti-missile defense is that, as Mr. McNamara said, "none of the systems at the present or foreseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States." The Soviet Union can build enough nuclear warheads to saturate any level of American defense. Even a Chinese missile attack on a small scale would probably destroy several American cities. Security against China will continue to rest largely on deterrence—and that means the existence of overwhelming offensive strength.

Some Administrative advisers believe American work on an anti-missile system will speed a Soviet response to American proposals for limitation of offensive and defensive missiles. But the Russians have more than sufficient incentive to open negotiations; the multiple-warhead offensive missiles the United States already is building will be able to penetrate Soviet defenses.

The decision to go ahead with a limited ABM system makes it less likely that the genie of a new nuclear arms race can be put back into the bottle. But it remains imperative that every effort continue to bring it under some kind of control.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1967]

THE WRONG RACE

"There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic to the development of all new nuclear weaponry," Secretary McNamara said yesterday in announcing President Johnson's decision to install a "thin," "China-oriented" \$5 billion anti-ballistic missile system over the next five years. And he added: "The danger in deploying this . . . system is going to be that pressures will develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented ABM system."

This is indeed the danger, and it is demonstrated in no small way by the very decision which Mr. McNamara made the occasion for an eloquent and compelling argument against a race for armaments and in favor of a "race toward reasonableness." Just last January, Mr. McNamara was telling the Senate Armed Services that a decision to build a Chinese-oriented ABM system "need not be made this year." In the meantime, he has produced no fresh evidence which would suggest a heightened Chinese threat. There has, however, been very heightened political pressure for an American ABM system to counter suspected ABM deployments by the Russians.

One can only conjecture whether this pressure may not have had something to do with the decision to announce the beginnings of a "thin," anti-Chinese ABM system at this time, and wonder, too, about the "reasonableness" of this.

Still less is the layman able to judge with much competence whether such a "thin" system is needed at all. On this point, the word and judgment of those who possess the intelligence data and the incredibly intricate technical knowledge must be taken largely on faith, for there was little in the Secretary's address to document this need.

Where Mr. McNamara was considerably more persuasive, however, was in his argument that the next step—towards a heavy ABM system—would take us and the Russians off on a "foolish and reckless course." It would, the Secretary said, be a strong inducement for the Soviets to "vastly increase their own offensive forces." And this, he added, would "make it necessary for us to respond in turn—and so the arms race would rush hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on either side."

This is the heart of the matter. And if we are obliged to assume that the Administration knows what it's talking about when it talks of the need for a "thin," Chinese-oriented ABM system, we must also assume that our officials and our experts and our scientists also know what they are talking about when they say that the Russian-American nuclear arms race has passed the point where either contestant can hope to gain decisively by continuing it.

If the Russians want to continue it anyway, out of false hope or for their own internal political needs, they would not require the pretext of the President's decision to deploy a new ABM missile system. Pretexts for arms spending can always be found. Conversely, if they see some merit in an agreement which would ratify the current stand-off, and slow or halt the nuclear arms race, they can quite readily ignore our ABM deployment for they are, after all, installing some such system of their own.

It is up to them—and up to us. If there is to be a race towards reasonableness, as Mr. McNamara rightly said, "we had better all run that race."

[From the New York Times, Sept. 19, 1967]

IN THE NATION: A NIGHTMARE DEBATE

(By Tom Wicker)

WASHINGTON, September 18.—Secretary McNamara, in announcing the Administration's decision to build a limited missile defense system, provided an unusual glimpse into the grisly, Strangelovish world of megatonnage and "assured destruction," where it makes no sense to "over-destroy" a target, but where one calculates how many millions of people must be incinerated before the damage becomes "unacceptable" to a society that wants to remain "viable."

All of that, of course, is merely horrible. The nuclear planner's world becomes truly grotesque—a maniacal joke on humanity—only when it is realized that nuclear "capability" is both fearfully destructive and practically impotent.

As McNamara points out, nuclear capability cannot stop subversion in Southeast Asia or force commercial concessions in Africa or keep Latin America subservient to Washington's wishes. Nuclear capability is not like the British Navy in the nineteenth century, or the Marines, or the Green Berets, it has none of the practical possibilities for asserting power or persuading the recalcitrant that all other weapons possess.

Thus, American nuclear capability, at root, exists to convince Russian nuclear capability that it cannot destroy the United States without causing the Soviet Union to be destroyed, too; and Soviet nuclear capability exists for the reverse reason. To use either for a lesser purpose would be both impractical and dangerous.

This is the macabre proposition that lies at the root of the dangerous and divisive political debate that is sure to follow McNamara's chilling speech. The question at issue will be whether the terrible balance that renders both Soviet and American nuclear power useless for anything but mutual destruction is slowly being disrupted so that nuclear warfare, however infernal, might become a practical proposition for the Soviet Union.

Already, influential members of Congress—backed by some powerful military voices—are saying that the limited missile defense system to be erected against possible Chinese attack should be expanded into a massive system capable of defending against a Soviet attack. McNamara argued vigorously against this proposition with the nightmare logic that makes the nuclear planner's world so incredible and so blood-curdling.

Building a defense against Soviet attack, he said, would cause the Soviets vastly to increase their offensive capability. At the same time they would surely deploy their own defensive system to match ours, so that the United States would have to improve the American offensive ability. In the end, both sides would have spent billions; neither would have achieved additional security; and the arms race would have spiraled a notch higher toward that point where the ultimate confrontation might become inevitable.

The counter-arguments are that the Soviet Union will not in the long run have the technical and industrial capacity to maintain such a nuclear race with the United States; but that if Moscow deploys a missile defense first, the Soviets may come to believe that the American nuclear capability is no longer effective, and that they can launch a nuclear war without being themselves destroyed. There are also those who believe that the Soviets already may have made significant gains in defensive technology, which the United States will have to match.

At a less rarefied level of argument, there is not much doubt that if the Soviets do proceed with a missile defense, any American administration is likely to come under tremendous political pressure to match it, on the grounds that the security of the American people is at stake.

Thus, in announcing plans to build the limited defense system, the Administration took several calculated risks. One was that the announcement would end any chance of negotiations with the Soviets on nuclear arms limitations—although McNamara himself believes the limited nature of the Administration plan will, instead, encourage the Soviets to take part in such talks.

Another was that taking the little step will produce irresistible political pressure for taking a large step that McNamara plainly labeled dangerous and foolish, since he believes it would set both Washington and Moscow off on another form of nuclear arms race.

Finally, if the Soviets believe the limited defense system is only a first step in a larger system erected against their nuclear power, they might move ahead with their own defenses. That would leave McNamara and the Administration no choice but to enter the "foolish and reckless" competition they hope to avoid.

[From the Providence Journal, Sept. 20, 1967]

AN OMINOUS DECISION

The administration's decision to start building an anti-missile defense system opens an ominous new chapter in the nuclear arms race. It also puts the nation on a course that is clouded with doubts, uncertainties, and imponderables.

This is to be only a "thin" anti-missile deployment. As Defense Secretary McNamara pointed out, no existing or foreseeable defensive system could present an effective counter to a massive enemy attack on this

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country involving swarms of sophisticated ballistic missiles. The offense still enjoys a wide margin of superiority over the defense in this area. No matter how elaborate the defense system may be, it can be penetrated and frustrated if the attacker has at his disposal large numbers of missiles equipped with presently available penetration aids. Both Soviet Russia and the United States now have arsenals of such missiles. Mr. McNamara says, and neither can erect an effective defense against them.

Why, then was the decision made to proceed with any anti-missile deployment? It was made, Mr. McNamara explains, not to protect against an attack from Soviet Russia, but to protect against Communist China. The Red Chinese now are developing a nuclear capacity. By the mid-1970s they are expected to have a few long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. At that time, Mr. McNamara says, Red China might be so "incautious" as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States.

"It would be insane and suicidal for her to do so," Mr. McNamara adds, "but one can conceive conditions under which China might miscalculate. We wish to reduce such possibilities to the minimum."

The "thin" deployment outlined by the administration, it is hoped, would be adequate to counter the relatively few and relatively unsophisticated nuclear missiles that China will have by the 1970s.

The price of this "thin" deployment of an anti-missile missile system comes high. Some four billion dollars already has been spent over the last seven years on preliminary development. Mr. McNamara suggests that an additional five billion may bring the system into being, though that estimate could balloon to a much higher figure as the complexities are worked out.

But far more disquieting than the costs involved are the pressures from many directions that are certain to be stimulated by this decision.

Some of the members of Congress—with Sen. John O. Pastore in the lead—already are demanding that we plunge ahead beyond the proposed "thin" deployment and erect a far more elaborate defensive system. They are quite unmoved by Mr. McNamara's arguments that such a system would be utterly futile.

No matter how carefully the "thin" deployment is worked out, there are certain to be some cities or some regions that feel they have been neglected. The consequence inevitably will be pressures from these cities or regions to extend the system to give them "protection."

Nor are our friends abroad likely to view this development with complacency. Some of them are possible targets of nuclear blackmail from Red China. If they see us erecting an umbrella to protect ourselves from the Chinese threat, is it not logical to expect that they will pressure us to extend the umbrella to include them?

More subtle pressures unquestionably will be brought to bear by the aerospace industries that will profit by this huge expenditure for an anti-missile system. The financial community already is fingering the potential gains, and the reaction in Wall Street to Mr. McNamara's announcement was a surge in the prices of stock of affected companies.

The total effect of these various pressures will be a massive effort to force us far beyond the relatively modest proposal outlined by Mr. McNamara. The Defense Secretary must have been aware of this consequence, for at one point in his address he observed: "There is kind of mad momentum. Intrinsic to the development of all nuclear weaponry."

There is, indeed, and a serious problem for the nation in the period ahead almost surely will be trying to keep our wits and our sense of values as we are swept along on this "mad momentum."

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1967]

A DEFENSE POLICY AND NEW DANGERS

(By Adam Yarmolinsky)

(NOTE.—The writer, former special assistant to Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, is currently a professor of law at Harvard University.)

The administration's decision to produce a light anti-ballistic missile system as a defense against the threat of a possible Chinese nuclear attack by the mid-1970's was heralded by the most carefully hedged pronouncement of major military policy ever delivered in public. But all that care may not have been enough to prevent a new arms race.

Secretary McNamara spent the great bulk of his oversize (for him) San Francisco speech explaining why an anti-ballistic missile system aimed at Soviet missiles would do us no good at all. He argued that the only reasonable U.S. response to a major Soviet anti-missile buildup would be to increase the number and sophistication of our own missiles, so that we would be quite sure that we still had what is called an assured second-strike capability. That is Pentagon language for the power to get through and knock out the Soviet Union with our surviving nuclear weapons, even after we had sustained the heaviest strike the Russians could launch against us. He also pointed out that the inevitable Soviet response to a U.S. anti-ballistic missile system aimed at catching their missiles in midair would be to build up their nuclear arsenal until they could saturate any ABM system we set up—and there was no doubt about their having the resources to do it. He went on to say that the United States had clear nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union—in raw megatonnage, as well as in numbers of weapons deliverable on target—but that this superiority, which would continue for the foreseeable future, did not and could not prevent the Soviets from acquiring a second-strike capability of their own.

With both sides able to destroy each other, but only at the price of self-destruction, we and the Soviets are indeed like Churchill's two scorpions in a bottle, and nuclear power is indeed an instrument of very limited effectiveness. In Berlin, in Korea, in Vietnam, nuclear power is of no value, on either side.

But the United States is still about to build an ABM system designed to catch any Chinese missile that might be thrown at us in the next decade. Secretary McNamara was a great pains to emphasize that neither the anti-Chinese system nor any system we could deploy would be effective against Soviet missiles. And he warned of the twin dangers of persuading ourselves that, with an anti-Chinese ABM system, our nuclear power could somehow substitute for conventional forces in Asia, or of sliding into the production of a more elaborate system directed against the Soviets.

There are a number of questions, however, that were not raised in his speech: why should the United States abandon reliance on its nuclear deterrent as an effective means to persuade the Chinese not to risk self-destruction? What if the Chinese were to threaten the United States with a surface missile based on a junk anchored a hundred miles off the California coast? Or a suitcase bomb smuggled into the country? If we can, and must rely on the deterrence of our assured second-strike capability not to be blackmailed by these possibilities, why can't we rely on deterrence against Chinese ICBMs?

But the decision has been taken. The important issue now is whether we can avoid dangers foreshadowed in the McNamara speech. Is it really possible to resist the pressures to expand the new system? If the projected talks with the Soviets fail to produce mutual restraints on building ABMs, will we find ourselves in another stage

of the nuclear arms race that gives us no more military security, consumes immense resources, and only makes it harder to reach essential political agreements like the non-proliferation treaty.

Even Soviet scientists concede that a political decision by the Soviet Government to deploy a major ABM system would be irrational. Surely the United States can avoid playing follow-the-leader in so senseless and dangerous a game. The issue is complex, but not so complex that it can't be understood, if properly explained, by those who will stop to read about it. President Eisenhower's warning about the military industrial complex is relevant here, but with vigilance it can be resisted, particularly since the defense budget has been remarkably well-protected from the kind of congressional log-rolling that goes on with, say, rivers and harbor appropriations.

[From Newsday, Sept. 25, 1967]

STATE OF AFFAIRS

(By Clayton Fritchey)

NEW YORK.—There is one unremarked peculiarity about the Administration's new "light" defense against the Chinese nuclear missiles which calls for further explanation.

The building of the projected anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system apparently can be stopped in its tracks by merely one Russian diplomatic move, or at least that seems to be the message that emerges from further study of Defense Secretary McNamara's exposition of the government's present nuclear strategy.

Not having any faith in the effectiveness of ABMs, and knowing they might ultimately cost the U.S. \$40 billion or more, the Administration has been trying for months to get an agreement with Russia against their deployment, either on a "heavy" or "light" scale.

Now, however, under increasing political and military pressure to build an anti-missile system in the U.S., the Administration has given ground, but it is significant that it emphasizes it has not lost hope that it can still reach an agreement with Russia to halt an ABM race.

McNamara is still pointedly saying "Both our nations would benefit from a properly safeguarded agreement first to limit, and later to reduce, both our offensive and defensive strategic nuclear forces." And he added, "We hope we can . . . achieve such an agreement." Later, the State Department's spokesman said the same thing. "We intend to continue trying," he said.

Beginning today, Secretary of State Rusk will be at the United Nations for a week, where he will be discussing missiles (among other things) with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister. The U.S. Ambassador to Russia, Llewellyn Thompson, and the chief U.S. disarmament negotiator, William C. Foster, also will be on hand.

But if Russia accedes to our wishes, and agrees to an ABM freeze, what happens to the Administration's newly-announced plan for a missile defense system against Communist China? The implication is that it would be dropped, but intentionally or not, there remains some confusion about this.

It goes without saying that Russia would hardly agree to a freeze if the U.S. insisted on going ahead, as planned, for the next five years with an new ABM system which could be used to defend against Russia as well as China. But if the Administration halts its ABM program in order to get the agreement it desires so much, does that leave the U.S. exposed to a Chinese nuclear attack? Or was that threat mostly conjured up to justify spending billions to develop the ABMs?

Alas, poor McNamara: it always devolves on him to try to explain to the public why it is urgent for the Administration to do things that it previously had said were undesirable, unnecessary, impracticable, extrava-

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agent, and dangerous. Such as bombing Hanoi and Haiphong. Such as the "barrier" across Vietnam. Such as the new ABM defense.

In announcing the anti-Chinese missile plan, McNamara made a withering attack on the whole ABM principle of defense. He virtually reduced it to fantasy. As a clincher, he said: "The four prominent scientists (who served as advisers to Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson) have unanimously recommended against the deployment of an ABM system designed to protect our population against Soviet attack."

McNamara's case against the effectiveness of ABMs is, in fact, so logical and overwhelming that it is hard to take seriously his involved explanation of why it is nevertheless necessary to develop an ABM system to save ourselves from China. Peking has already astonished the world with the speed of its nuclear development. If, as McNamara says, Russia can easily penetrate the "heaviest" possible ABM defense, it surely cannot be long before China is able to penetrate a "light" one.

The ABMs may not prove very effective against China when it develops long-range nuclear capacity, but momentarily at least they have knocked the wind out of Administration critics who had hoped to make political capital of the issue, which, after all, is an important mission, too.

Even more important, though, is what the Administration will say when and if the U.S. and Russia agree on an ABM freeze. Who will be tapped to tell the American public why China is suddenly no longer a nuclear threat to the U.S., and hence the new anti-missile system is no longer needed? We hope it isn't McNamara. He deserves relief.

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1967]
New Soviet Crisis Seen Over U.S. Missile Plan

(By Victor Zorza)

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's announcement that the United States is to build an ABM system to protect itself against China threatens to precipitate a major crisis in the Kremlin, of the kind that led to the fall of Khrushchev in 1964.

Many Soviet leaders will insist, in spite of McNamara's strenuous effort to reassure them, that the American ABM system is designed to neutralize not only Chinese but also Soviet missiles. They will therefore use the American announcement as ammunition in their struggle, which has grown increasingly intense in recent months, to get a much bigger slice of the nation's resources for a major rearmament program.

In this struggle Brezhnev, the party secretary, stands by and large on the military platform, and Premier Kosygin on the civilian.

Evidence gleaned between the lines of the Soviet press shows that Kosygin's position has already been dangerously undermined by the military political lobby. It is now in danger of collapsing altogether.

The Kremlin policy struggle is not a straight-forward contest between civilians and military. Nor is it a stark confrontation between those who simply want more money for defense, and those who prefer to have more consumer goods. Within this rough and ready outline, it is possible to discern contradictory trends and cross-currents, the most important of which concerns the Soviet ABM program.

Whether the Soviet Union is to build a full-fledged ABM system has been a major political issue in the Kremlin for many years. There is no reason to assume that the ABM installations around Moscow represent an advanced system. There is even less reason to make any such assumption about Soviet installations elsewhere—near Leningrad and Tallin, east of the Urals, or in South Russia.

EFFICACY QUESTIONED

The latest outburst of the Soviet ABM debate became evident in February, when some of Russia's highest military authorities took mutually contradictory positions in public on the efficacy of the Soviet system. Some of the statements, made on Armed Forces Day, could be read as saying that the Soviet ABM system was capable of providing reliable defenses—while others seemed designed to suggest that it provided no such thing.

The controversy was still at full tilt earlier this month when Marshal Krylov, the commander-in-chief of the strategic missile forces, listed publicly the factors which "ensure that rockets are virtually invulnerable, especially when used en masse."

For Krylov to say that missiles are "virtually invulnerable" is to deny any validity to the argument in favor of a Soviet ABM. For him to argue that large numbers make them even less vulnerable is to say that he wants more missiles, not more ABMs. This is much the same as McNamara's own arguments against those who want an anti-Soviet ABM.

The contrary view has been expressed most recently by Marshal Chulikov, the head of civil defense, who listed "our ABM" as being among "the best means of defending our country against a nuclear attack." It was their task to ensure, he said, that hostile missiles "will be destroyed even before they approach Soviet borders."

The inconclusive nature of the Soviet policy debate and the shifting alignments within even the military leadership, are best shown by the fact that during the February outburst Marshal Chulikov was still among those who tended to cast doubt on the effectiveness on an ABM.

PRESSURE INCREASES

But after February it became evident that the pressure for a Soviet ABM had greatly increased, and Marshal Chulikov's change of front is only one of a number of indications of the growing strength of the military-political lobby. The pressure found vent publicly in the military press, which had also provided similar indications, just before the fall of Khrushchev, of the gradual weakening of his position.

At that time, the military-political lobby urged the allocation of greater resources to heavy industry and to steel production which provide, even in modern times, the necessary underpinning for defense industries. The same symbols, and issues, have re-emerged in the course of the current Soviet policy debate, but this time they are linked with the demand for even greater resources needed to develop and deploy an ABM system.

Modern weapons development, said "Red Star," the army paper, had raised the role of economic factors to an "extraordinary" extent, and had faced the economy—"and particularly heavy industry"—with a number of new demands. The production of new weapons, including "anti-missile defenses, requires huge economic efforts," the newspaper said.

The military competition with the civilian sector for more money was only one element in the struggle. Kosygin was the great champion of the economic reform which would, in his view, improve Russia's economic and scientific potential so greatly as to provide the country with the necessary defense capability. Indeed, Kosygin's argument can be read as pressing for economic reform as the best way to provide the necessary military strength.

But writers in "Communist of the Armed Forces" argued that the reform, and economic and scientific potential, did not of themselves constitute military strength. "Actual defense measures," they argued, "are also necessary." And the implication was that those who were stressing the economic aspect were neglecting the real needs of defense.

How the fortunes of the battle went could

best be judged by observing the debate on steel production. Under Khrushchev, this fight led to the identification of the military-political lobby as "metal eaters" in attacks on them published in the Soviet press.

After the fall of Khrushchev the steel production target was increased, but last year the differences between Brezhnev and Kosygin on this issue were almost allowed to come out in public. At the Party congress, Brezhnev condemned (Khrushchev's) "incorrect viewpoint" that modern substitutes would reduce the need for steel, and announced that this error would now be put right in the development of the steel industry.

BREZHNEV CHALLENGED

Kosygin, on the other hand, opened his remarks on steel by assuring the Congress that the industry had "considerable achievements" to its credit, and that in some ways it had even surpassed "the most developed capitalist countries." He was, in effect, challenging Brezhnev's implied view that the country needed much more steel. By last May Brezhnev also came to praise the steel industry—but only in order to bury Kosygin. He recalled that before the last war Russia was producing 18 million tons of steel; after the war this rose to 60 million, and now it was a 100 million. "And still," he said, "this cannot satisfy us."

It evidently satisfied Kosygin, but not the military-political lobby. Although the official steel target for 1970 is 124-126 million tons, Kosygin's planners had sabotaged it so effectively that the party leadership was constrained to issue a public rebuke to them.

This was in the form of a joint decision by the party central committee and the Government, which declared the "accelerated development" of the steel industry to be a highly important national task. It therefore ordered the "substantial intensification" of capital construction in the steel industry to enable it to achieve the 1970 output targets.

This can only mean that Kosygin, who is in charge of the economy, had viewed the proposed massive increase from just over 100 million tons this year to nearly 130 million tons within the next three years as wrong.

If he had provided the necessary production capacity in the first place, there would have been no need last month to issue orders for a speedup. The announcement was a major defeat for Kosygin, and a victory for the military-political lobby, whose pressure on behalf of heavy industry was also a pressure for steel—and for a Soviet ABM system.

As Marshal Krylov's article showed earlier this month, the victory of the military political lobby was confined to the steel issue—otherwise he would not have been able to publicly denigrate the effectiveness of the ABM.

But if the United States is building one, then those Soviet leaders who might have been willing to engage in talks on an ABM moratorium with the U.S. will have had the ground knocked from under them.

But might the American action provide a final incentive for the Russians, perhaps, to engage in talks with the United States, before deciding on a large-scale Soviet ABM development? It just conceivably might—but McNamara would first have to allay the misgivings which his announcement is bound to have aroused in the Kremlin.

[From the New Yorker, Sept. 30, 1967]

THE TALK OF THE TOWN

For a few encouraging years, it seemed as if President Eisenhower's valedictory warning against "the military-industrial complex" could safely be set aside. Civilian leadership, prodded and supported by President Kennedy, overwhelmed the startled generals with an almost terrifyingly brilliant combination of cost-analysis techniques, computerized

strategy, and austere human intelligence. Secretary of Defense McNamara and his men soon knew more about the business of defense than the military itself, and combined the courage to make decisions with the skill to justify them. For a while, the enemies of "the McNamara revolution" were reduced to making the extraordinarily feeble and self-defeating assertion that the new civilian leadership was too intelligent and logical—as if the business of defense were properly an affair of the heart. In any event, new and terribly expensive weapons, the B-70 bomber among them, were rejected by the civilian leadership—judgments that in retrospect are for the most part unimpeachable. The effects of the McNamara years are too deeply embedded to be wholly dislodged, but there is mounting evidence that the military is now using the increased leverage given it by the Vietnam war to reassert its primacy over civilian control, and is finding an increasingly responsive President and Secretary of State. The military chiefs' recommendations for escalation in Vietnam now become national policy, despite apparent objections by the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle G. Wheeler, disagrees ever more boldly and publicly with his civilian superiors, and clearly this superlatively cautious man would not venture to do so without considerable informal encouragement. Recently, Marine Commandant General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., took it upon himself to tell the country that Vietnam was far more important than any minor disturbances by a few Negro malcontents—exactly the kind of military intrusion into broad national concerns that seemed to have disappeared with the Eisenhower years. And now all these tokens of a military renaissance have culminated in the decision, after a decade-long battle, to build an anti-ballistic-missile, or A.B.M., system. Both the Secretary of Defense and the President were previously opposed to such a system.

Almost every independent scientific expert has concluded that a missile-defense system would be a costly, probably dangerous, and finally futile addition to the arms race. Yet we are going to build it just the same. Because the military and its allies want to. And because the President is unwilling to confront the political costs and pressures of a refusal. Apparently, the most important reason for the decision is the desire to deprive Republicans of the opportunity to make "the anti-missile gap" an issue in 1968. No one has clearly defined the phrase "military-industrial complex." Certainly, it's not, in any sense, a coherent and malevolent conspiracy. Nevertheless, it does exist. It consists basically of much of the military leadership, the large industrial firms that make weapons, and the members of Congress who have assimilated their public careers with the cause of armed strength. These people are impelled by motives ranging all the way from the desire for profits, through honest fear, to fierce patriotic dedication. However, the disparate impulses invariably converge in a continuous and powerful advocacy of more and better weapons and in an opposition to arms control. With the decision to begin the missile defense, they have won perhaps their greatest victory.

The arguments that are used to justify this decision indicates its remoteness from any logical analysis of the national interest. Until a few weeks ago, our official position was that we would not set up missile defenses if the Russians would also refrain. Now we intend to build a "light" system (only from five to ten billion dollars' worth), to defend ourselves against still nonexistent Chinese rockets. Plainly, if we need a defense against China, then to promise not to set up A.B.M.'s if the Soviet Union similarly held back was a dangerous blunder, since it would leave us defenseless against the Chinese. This mask

of illogic must, therefore, conceal the real consideration: the military and its allies are eager to get going with missile defenses. We cannot afford a real defense against Russia, which by McNamara's estimate would cost forty billion dollars, and might well cost twice as much, and a smaller effort can be justified only by calling upon that convenient devil China.

The arguments that swirl around missile defense are labyrinthine and often technical. Yet there are some fairly clear considerations—the same ones that led Secretary McNamara to oppose any defense and that now support his continuing hostility to a system for countering Soviet attack. The first such consideration—and one that in a different official mood would be conclusive—is that there is no way to build a defense that cannot be overwhelmed. If the Russians build enough missiles, or put more warheads on the missiles they already have, they will be able to blow us up no matter how many A.B.M.s we construct. As the Secretary has said, it is extremely unrealistic to assume that the Russians would not do this. Of course, we would do the same. (Soon, scientific progress will lay to rest the archaic formula "One rocket, one city" by topping a single missile with ten or more hydrogen bombs, which after crossing the Atlantic together would disperse to ten different urban areas.) Thus, after we had spent tens of billions of dollars and encircled our cities with nuclear weapons, both countries would still be able to destroy each other—which is exactly where we are now. If the Soviet Union should construct defenses while we refrained from doing so, we could nullify its efforts simply by improving our offensive power, and thus again preserve the now familiar assurance of mutual destruction. There is no escape from this logical certainty. For the important thing about missile defenses is that they will not stop all missiles. A certain number will get through. Perhaps twenty-five per cent, perhaps fifty per cent, perhaps seventy-five per cent. No one really knows, and no one will ever know until the day of Armageddon. There is no way of testing such defenses against all the stratagems and technological devices that may be contrived to deceive them. Anyway, air defense has invariably proved less effective in actual combat than on the testing fields. Even if some distant day of scientific wonders enables us to guarantee ninety-per-cent perfection, then, as ten hydrogen warheads descend on Washington, there will be, at most, a few moments for quiet pride in the fact that nine of them will never reach the target.

The second consideration is that the potential cost of this particular upward spiral in the arms race is unlimited. In this respect, it is the ultimate dream of a weapons system. The flaw in previous strategies was that once there were enough missiles to blow the other fellow up a few times over, no more were really needed. (We have three of four times as many as the Russians, but we still assume they could destroy us.) However, once a race between defense and offense begins, there is never enough. Of course, it is possible to stop at any arbitrary point—say, ten billion dollars, or fifty—and we undoubtedly will stop, but that makes no logical sense. For if you are serious about defense, you must strive for a system that really defends you, and since there is no such system, you must build forever. Russia and, ultimately, China will increase their offensive strength to counter our A.B.M.s, which means we will need more. And we will increase our own offensive strength as their defenses grow. All this will be distorted by the pragmatic necessity of assuming that the other side has better defenses than it actually has and that our own will not work as well as we have calculated. In addition, there will be the pressure from unguarded cities. After all, it will be hard for

the citizens of Butte, Montana, to understand why they should be left to nuclear incineration while New Yorkers are permitted to view the holocaust comfortably on television as A.B.M.s swat hostile rockets from Manhattan skies.

These are among the reasons our government has continued to reject a full-scale defense against Russia, though few doubt that, however limited the present step may be, it points the way toward far more extensive systems. For even if we accept today's justification at face value, the argument for a defense against China lacks rational force. McNamara, with his fatal bent toward intellectual honesty, has practically said as much, announcing our decision with the far from ringing affirmation that since we must be "conservative" and must always take into account "the possible irrational behavior" of our foes, "there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light deployment of U.S. A.B.M.s . . . is prudent," and, anyway, "the system would be relatively inexpensive." (Martin Luther King, Roy Wilkins, et al. will be glad to know it is only five billion dollars to start.) Such strained and reluctant prose must surely flow from the Secretary's knowledge of how little we are buying.

Defensive rockets will be pointed toward our northern border to intercept Chinese missiles taking, as the laws of physics recommend, the great-circle route to America (although some long-range A.B.M.s will theoretically be able to defend other approaches to the country). This will make it possible for most collisions to occur over Canada. Other A.B.M.s will be placed around our missile "farms," popularly known as bases. Once the Chinese build a large-scale striking force—say, from one hundred to two hundred warheads—this defense will be useless for exactly the same reasons that now apply in the case of Russia. Thus, its value is limited to the period between the present—when the Chinese have no missiles—and the time they enter the select company of nations able to devastate their enemies. This may be a very short interval indeed, since once a country has built its first dozen rockets it can easily, and swiftly, build a hundred more. If the Chinese manage to uncover the fact that many warheads can be carried on a single missile, the interval may be shortened even further. Moreover, the ingenious Chinese may well find ways to avoid their assigned routes and our defenses—for example, delivering their bombs by submarine and short-range rockets that will shoot under the system. While their force remains small, and if they are unable to fool or circumvent the "light" defense, it will probably stop a moderately high proportion of their missiles.

Although the abstractions of strategic thought lend themselves to infinite combinations of conjectural moves and counter-moves, the fact is that such a defense would have little effect on Chinese policy.

The most the Chinese can hope for from a small striking force is to hold a few American cities hostage to nuclear destruction, thus increasing our reluctance to get involved in a war with them. Since we must accept the likelihood that some missiles will slip through any defense, there is no way to frustrate this objective. Therefore, we will always have to assume that the price of an all-out war against China may well be Detroit, Los Angeles, and Chicago. If we ourselves should suddenly decide to make a surprise nuclear attack on China defenses would be unnecessary, since we could destroy their missiles on the ground. So our A.B.M.s will save some American lives only if the Chinese impatiently decide to shoot their thirty or forty missiles at the United States in the knowledge that the consequence will be the total destruction of China, instead of waiting a few years, by the end of which time they can really do the job properly. Even this weak justification for the "light" defense is

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diluted by the probability that nuclear war between the United States and China would involve the Soviet Union, against which there is no defense.

If this decision takes us toward the probable goal of a much larger defense system, perhaps the most ominous consequences will be to the national psyche. Until now, nuclear war has been a terrifying but rather abstract possibility. Our weapons of destruction have been secreted on remote Western ranges, and their reality has been communicated to the average citizen through the dulling repetition of statistics and technical terms. If A.B.M.s expand, nuclear rockets will ring our major cities, and, undoubtedly, on Armed Forces Day and other patriotic occasions parents will drive their children out to see the impressive display of national might. The dawning awareness that we all live in armed camps will almost surely have a depressing effect on our thinking and our way of life. The constant physical reminder of danger, with its inevitable addition to the strains of daily life, may well bring closer the time when we will finally say, "Let's get it all over with." At least, we can be sure it will not help to liberate the more noble and creative impulses of the human spirit.

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the *Record* an excellent article entitled "MIRV and the Offensive Missile Race," written by Robert Kleiman, and published in the New York Times of Monday, October 9, 1967; and an article entitled "The Grand Illusion," written by Edwin Diamond, and published in *Newsweek* magazine of October 2, 1967, from which I have quoted.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the *Record*, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 9, 1967]

MIRV AND THE OFFENSIVE MISSILE RACE

(By Robert Kleiman)¹

Pressure from Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a heavy antiballistic-missile (ABM) system oriented to defense against Soviet attack reflects an old military weakness: preparing to fight the last war.

Technology has overtaken the ABM. The United States already has developed an effective antidote to it—sophisticated multiple warheads for the new offensive missiles, Minuteman III and Poseidon, which are to be deployed in the early 1970's. Official estimates indicate that the Soviet Union can do the same in five to seven years.

Whatever the case for a "light" ABM defense against primitive Chinese missiles, arguments for either superpower to build a \$40 billion missile defense to protect its cities against the other are now as dated as the Billy Mitchell bomber-vs.-battleship fight.

A hitherto-secret four-letter acronym, MIRV—Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles, and that key word is "independent"—describes an advance in nuclear weaponry that will enable the offense to penetrate any defense now foreseeable.

"Both our missile defense system and [Russia's] were designed before MIRV's came along as a serious possibility," Secretary McNamara admits.

One MIRV missile will be able to carry five or ten or more hydrogen warheads that can separate in flight, change trajectory several times and fly independently to five or ten or more widely dispersed, preselected targets. Equipped with MIRV, America's 1,700 strategic missiles could carry 17,000 or more separately targetable warheads, dwarfing the widely discussed Soviet increase this past year from 300 to about 450 single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's).

Early in the ABM debate, Secretary McNamara predicted that the Soviet Union and the United States would respond to the other's ABM deployment, if undertaken, by improving offensive capabilities. "All we would accomplish," the Defense Secretary said, "would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side."

But now, before substantial ABM systems have been deployed on either side, rapidly advancing technology has vaulted Washington and Moscow into the offensive missile race that was feared for the post-ABM period. And this race is far more dangerous and difficult to control than the race in missile defenses which the U.S. seeks to head off.

The vast increase in offensive warheads that MIRV can provide will spur fear by each that the other is achieving first-strike capability that permits pre-emptive attack.

Extraordinary advances in missile accuracy add to this fear. There was a time when ten incoming missiles were required to destroy one hardened ICBM and its single warhead in an underground silo. A one-for-one exchange is now almost attainable.

In the MIRV era, allowing for misfires and misses, ten missiles carrying 100 warheads will be able to destroy 80 to 90 ICBM's caught in their silos, thus wiping out 800 to 900 enemy warheads. If those 800 to 900 were launched first, the other side would need at least 800 to 900 antimissile missiles to intercept most of them.

The logic of this arithmetic—by increasing the fear that the other side may pre-empt—could turn the relative stability of mutual deterrence into a nightmare of nuclear nervousness.

Can this era still be headed off? Soviet-American talks on the limitation of offensive and defensive missiles have been pending since February. But Moscow has dallied in fixing a date, agreement within the Government evidently not easy.

There have been repeated hints that a concrete American proposal, rather than a plan for exploratory talks, would enable the Soviet leadership to shape an agreed policy more easily. Conversely, the lack of a firm date for a conference makes it difficult for the divided Washington bureaucracy to reach interagency agreement on a specific proposal; a deadline would force agreement.

Secretary Rusk told the Soviet Union in early September that, once a date was fixed, American negotiators would come to a conference with "specific and detailed proposals." Some of these proposals may have to be made in advance to get a Soviet response. But Washington is still unprepared to make them, despite months of desultory interagency consultations.

Here is a field in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Congressional Joint Atomic Energy Commission could make invaluable contributions. Instead of pressure to race in the building of obsolete defensive missile systems, what is needed is a plan to limit the ABM-MIRV race. It will not be easy.

Spy satellites can count ABM's and offensive missile silos without the on-site inspection Russia has always refused. But they cannot tell whether a MIRV-tipped missile contains five or fifty hydrogen warheads. New approaches to arms control need devising.

The tragedy is that both the United States and the Soviet Union, according to Secretary McNamara, already have strategic nuclear arsenals "greatly in excess" of their present security needs. And "we're planning another big increase" in offensive capability that will be able to overcome "the most powerful defenses the Soviets could build," Mr. McNamara has warned.

With Moscow, presumably, making a similar plan, time clearly is running out.

[From *Newsweek*, Oct. 2, 1967]

THE GRAND ILLUSION

(By Edwin Diamond)

Secretary McNamara's decision to go ahead with an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system is based on a set of brilliantly reasoned, highly sophisticated, and strongly persuasive arguments. But the decision is wrong, and the consequences of this error will burden every American for years to come.

Instead of strengthening the national security, the ABM decision may well undermine it, for it upsets the present delicate balance of nuclear terror based on the twin implicit assumptions of a strong (four-to-one) but not overwhelming U.S. offensive missile superiority and a modest Soviet defensive advantage. Worse, the ABM move signals another dangerous upward spiral in the nuclear-arms race which may lead to a renewed drive by both the U.S. and Soviet Union to add new offensive weapons to the overkill arsenals each already possesses. Roswell L. Gilpatric, McNamara's own former Deputy Defense Secretary, fears the ABM means a U.S. global strategy based more on conflict than accommodation. The go-ahead, he said, "is certainly a move in the wrong direction."

Let's put these abstractions in concrete terms—and concrete is exactly where we are now heading. At the very least, this new nuclear escalation means the expenditure of untold billions in exchange for a wholly illusory security blanket. Whether the U.S. spends \$4 to \$5 billion for the "thin" ABM system to guard its Minuteman strike force, or \$40 billion for the "thickening" of the blanket to protect major American cities, or \$400 billion to protect smaller cities, the end result will be the same: all of us will still be 30 minutes away from nuclear annihilation.

MOLE SOCIETY

Indeed, with the ABM escalation, the possibility of this supposedly "unthinkable" missile Armageddon is greater, no smaller. All of us have now been propelled by the logic of nuclear events that McNamara grasps so well toward the next era of the atomic age—the mole society where the cities and civilians of the 1980's may have to burrow underground to join the concrete Minuteman silos sunk in the 1960s and the subterranean ABM control centers built in the 1970s.

Unlikely, you will say; right out of some science-fiction paperback. But who would have believed, ten years ago, at the time of Sputnik 1 and the "missile gap," that the U.S. within five years would possess the nuclear missile to destroy the Soviet society and population five times over?

What evidence have I that McNamara—one of the most brilliant and dedicated minds in the nation—is wrong about the ABM? What proof is there that the U.S. has embarked on a dangerous new course? The evidence is abundant. Precisely because McNamara has such a firm grasp of the complexities of the age, he himself has supplied some of the best arguments against the ABM and a new arms race. In fact, if an analyst were to overlay McNamara's speech with one of the cryptologist's sheets that cover some paragraphs while revealing others, the case for the present stabilized strategic situation would become compelling.

ACTION-REACTION

First of all, as McNamara makes clear, the U.S. now has "a numerical superiority over the Soviet Union in reliable, accurate and effective warheads [that] is both greater than we had originally planned, and is in fact more than we require." This, to use the blunt term, is what overkill means. And politically motivated "missile-gap" cries of overkill, to be blunt again, is the legacy of politically motivated "missile-gap" cries of the late 1950s. The panic button was pushed in the U.S. and a real missile gap did even-

¹ Robert Kleiman is a member of the editorial board of *The Times*.

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tually materialize. But as McNamara points out in his speech, this gap favors the U.S. At present the U.S. has 2,200 strategic nuclear weapons in readiness against 700 for the U.S.S.R. The Russian response to this U.S. superiority has been to concede an offensive disparity. In effect the Soviet Union acknowledged that the richness and ingenuity of American technology could not be matched. But it began an ABM system—the Russian military has been traditionally defense minded—as part of what McNamara calls the “action-reaction” of the arms race.

McNamara has been conspicuously unworried by this deployment. As he explains it, the offense always has an advantage over the defense and any ABM system “can rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending over more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them.”

The logic of the situation calls for one of the superpowers to forego the next turn in the vicious cycle of action-reaction. A Soviet McNamara—they have their sophisticated strategists and their war gamesmen, too—might argue that the Soviet ABM deployment represented a limited and measured response to U.S. superiority, a move intended to assure Russian second-strike capability and thus make the Soviet deterrent credible. Why not leave the arms race in this trade-off situation? Why upset the fearfully delicate balance of terror with a U.S. ABM system?

McNamara's answer last week was: because of the looming Chinese nuclear-missile threat of the 1970's. The proposed U.S. ABM system, in McNamara's words, is “Chinese-oriented,” designed to deter Chairman Mao or his successors from an attack on the U.S. It is at this point that McNamara's computer logic breaks down.

MAD ADVENTURE

First, if Peking is suicidally mad enough to mount an attack on a country possessing 200 times more nuclear power than it has, then no amount of objective reality in the form of an American ABM barrier can dissuade the Chinese from their insanity. If the Chinese are bent on nuclear genocide, they could smuggle an atomic bomb into San Francisco harbor aboard a freighter and detonate it. No ABM system can protect against such mad adventures.

Second, the Soviet Union can also argue that its ABM is “Chinese-oriented,” and merely a matter of insurance against an irrational attack by a country that shares an uneasy border with Russia and is violently hostile to it. After all, the same madness that might lead the Chinese to attack the U.S. might also push Mao over the brink with the Russians. Would we believe the Russians if they said, “It's the Chinese we are worried about—ignore our ABM”? Yet we expect them to believe our ABM is China-oriented.

The truth is the ABM decision was dictated not by strategy but by politics. Computer logic breaks down because men aren't computers; they are imperfect beings shaped by history and emotion as well as reason. There are really two McNamaras. One McNamara coolly attempts to manage the arms race by force of argument and intellect. He even on occasion does the Russians' thinking for them, patiently elucidating the nuclear strategic options available and their consequences in speeches and in briefings held for the press, but aimed at Moscow. The second McNamara is an American, a patriot and a member of the Johnson Administration (just as his opposite in the Kremlin is a Russian, a patriot, and a member of the Communist Party).

It is well known in Washington that Secretary McNamara for months has opposed deployment of the ABM system despite the urgings of the Joint Chiefs Staff, of Democratic hawks and of Republicans sensing a hot campaign issue for 1968. As James Reston

suggested last week, the ABM system launched by McNamara is not aimed at blocking the Chinese or even the Russians, but the Republicans. By acceding now to the clamor McNamara has blunted the GOP charge that he is “indifferent” to the defense of the American people.

GOOD GUYS

Yet, isn't the U.S. asking—a bit illogically—the Soviet McNamara to be indifferent to the defense of his people? More fundamentally, isn't the U.S. saying—also a bit illogically—that when it comes to the crunch, two standards apply: we are the good guys and would never attack first; you are the bad guys and you might attack first, and that is why we must have a four-to-one offensive superiority and defensive parity (at least)—and a lead in whatever else we decide to build.

Last week was the time for patience and courage—patience to lecture the Russians once again on the reasons behind the eminently equitable U.S. plan to put a freeze on all missiles, offensive and defensive courage, in the words of former Kennedy science adviser Jerome Wiesner, to run the risks of deescalation instead of the risks of new escalation; and patience and courage to explain to the American people, even in a prelection year, why the ABM is not good for their security.

Instead, Washington gave us the ABM. By some curious alchemy, the Administration has convinced itself that the thin ABM system doesn't really change the balance of terror: only a thick system would do that. But thin leads to thick. It is all like that celebrated biology experiment: a frog is placed in a tank of water; daily the temperature is increased one degree; the frog exists as always—until one more degree . . . the water boils . . . the frog dies.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield?

Mr. CLARK. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. CHURCH. I know that the Senator has already placed in the Record a most absorbing and provocative article published in this morning's Washington Post, but I think it would not be amiss to quote four or five rather pungent paragraphs from it.

As the Senator knows, I have been very much interested in the problems of the NATO alliance and in American policy in Europe. I think we have to take into account European reaction to the Administration's decision to go forward with the deployment of an ABM system.

Let me quote the pertinent paragraphs from the article:

To the Western Europeans, China is very remote, its potential physical threat to them is remote, and extra suspicion therefore falls on the U.S. decision.

Western Europeans, preoccupied with the Soviet Union and their own security, automatically interpreted the U.S. decision in that dimension.

What looms in West Germany's official concern is that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty that the Soviet Union and the United States are urging it to participate in, might preclude a Western European anti-missile system, because an ABM system employs nuclear warheads to knock down incoming missiles.

REACTION IN BONN

From Bonn, Dan Morgan of The Washington Post Foreign Service reported that the American ABM decision has further undermined the credibility of U.S. intentions about the nuclear treaty. Some Germans are contending that the U.S. action has cast doubt on the stability of the existing nuclear “bal-

ance of terror,” and that the whole structure of defense concepts may require reexamination.

But paradoxically, the British position, as stated at Scarborough, England, last week by Defense Minister Denis Healey is that: “There is no evidence whatsoever that any ABM system of which we have any knowledge today will produce a meaningful deterrent against a major nuclear power.”

Mr. President, I make reference to these paragraphs because I think they illustrate the extent of the argument which our decision has precipitated in Western Europe among our NATO allies.

Insofar as Mr. Healey's comments go, I think they coincide with the judgment of our own Secretary of Defense.

Mr. CLARK. I think this is so, if I may interject—although the Secretary of Defense, for reasons which are rather obscure to me, appears to have charged his view insofar as protection against China is concerned. I commented during the course of my speech that I thought the Secretary of Defense, for whom I have the greatest admiration, was singularly unconvincing when he said that there is no use building an ABM system to deter the Soviet Union but there is justification for doing so against China. This makes no sense to me whatsoever.

Mr. CHURCH. It places us in the anomalous position of building an ABM system, not to defend ourselves against Russian ballistic missiles, which they do possess but, rather, to defend ourselves against Chinese ballistic missiles, which they do not possess.

Mr. CLARK. That is quite correct.

It is now, of course, just a matter of speculation as to the size, dimension, and capability of a Chinese delivery system. Moreover, if the Chinese are going to embark upon the construction of a sizable delivery system for their developing nuclear arsenal, it only makes sense that they will strive to create a system which will have effectiveness; they are not going to be content with a system so small in its delivery capability that it could, presumably, be fended off by an ABM system.

So, what Secretary McNamara is saying, really, is that we are now going to build an ABM system to protect ourselves against an anticipated Chinese capability of very limited scope. But, as the Chinese capability grows, then, the pressures are going to increase to enlarge and deepen the system, until it becomes a major and enormously expensive new addition to the nuclear arms race. The argument that if a few ABM's are good, more must be better, will prove irresistible, yet, Mr. McNamara says that, against a major nuclear capability, an ABM system will not be effective?

That is why I say we ought not to deceive ourselves. We are not talking about a \$5 billion ABM system; we are talking about the first step toward the creation of a \$50 billion—indeed, before we are finished, a \$100 billion—system, which, in my judgment, will be the most extravagant and expensive sieve ever constructed in history.

What is worse is that, as we proceed with its construction—given the fascination of the American people with our advanced technology, as we invest enor-

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mous sums in this system, as we publicize its capabilities, as we demonstrate that an antiballistic missile has successfully intercepted another missile in flight, the American people are going to embrace the system with an eagerness to believe in it, and we will enthral ourselves with the fancied belief that we have fashioned a marvelous shield. And as we assume that we have, indeed, fashioned such a shield, the risks of nuclear war will increase. They will not diminish; they will increase, because once the balance of terror is tipped by the assumption that we have designed a shield for ourselves, which will give us protection against a massive nuclear onslaught, the risk of nuclear war will increase. Our leaders will be emboldened to undertake and assume risks that they otherwise would avoid, because of the knowledge that nuclear war would result in certain obliteration.

So I think, on balance, this is not a contribution to the security of the United States, but ultimately a contribution to the ultimate insecurity of the United States, for, in the end, it may well result in enhancing the risks of a nuclear catastrophe which would see us consumed by the witchfire of a thermonuclear exchange.

I thoroughly agree with the statement, which I think was made earlier in this debate, that the real reason for this decision has nothing to do with China, which presently has no capability whatsoever of reaching the United States. We are not building this system for the Chinese; we are building it for the Republicans. Mr. Reston has written that it is internal politics which dictated this decision, so that this administration will not have to explain to the American people why we are not building an ABM system, when the Russians are.

The difficulty, in the coming campaign, of explaining that an ABM system really does not contribute to the security of the country, really does not constitute a meaningful defense, is too much to face against the simplicity of the argument that "they are doing it; therefore we should do it, also." This has been the major impetus for the decision to deploy a so-called thin ABM shield.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have an additional 15 minutes.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I had a couple of matters to put in the Record, if the Senator will yield to me long enough to do that.

Mr. CLARK. I shall be happy to. The majority leader asked me to request additional time. If the Senator will permit the Senator from Idaho to complete his statement—and the Senator from Oregon has been waiting for a long time—I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I wanted to take only a moment.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, may I have a second or two to conclude my statement?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. CHURCH. I want to commend the Senator from Pennsylvania for an excellent presentation.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to granting the request of the Senator from Pennsylvania for an additional 15 minutes? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield briefly?

Mr. CLARK. I yield to the Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I welcome the speech of the Senator from Pennsylvania and associate myself with every word of it. Once again, I follow his leadership on a very vital foreign policy issue. I call his attention to the speech I made last Friday concerning the policy of the Johnson administration in freezing funds needed for domestic programs; but I wish to make these further brief comments.

This ABM program is a program that the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, speaking for the Johnson administration, is throwing out to appease the war wings of both the Republican and Democratic parties. I think that is the politics involved here. The Senator from Idaho used the word "deceived" quite properly. I think it is a deceptive program, for it will not give the American people the protection that the propagandists seek to fool them into believing it will give them. Even from a scientific standpoint, scientists give little assurance that it will give any protection whatsoever.

Mr. CLARK. In fact, if I may interrupt the Senator for a moment, there is not a reputable scientist in the country today who believes that this system would be of the slightest protection against a Russian attack.

Mr. MORSE. That is the point I wish to make; and I point out further that this program cannot be sold, nor can most of the war programs of our Government be sold, without scaring the American people almost to death. This is part of the fear psychology or the fear propaganda being built up to frighten the American people. The American people can be frightened, as well as other people can be frightened. When people are frightened, they act emotionally and glandularly, not rationally.

That is part of this sales program to get us past November 1968. As I explained on Friday, I cannot be a party to it. It is also a part of the fear program being used to force through an unjustifiable income tax increase, while this administration refuses to face up to plugging tax loopholes and making cuts so as not to take away from the American people what they are entitled to in meeting our critical economic problems here at home.

But going back to the fact that it is not going to give us protection, let us go all the way, and assume that we knock out all the enemy missiles. We would still not knock out the fallout; and it is the fallout that will do most of the killing, not the explosive effects of the bombs. The explosion would kill thousands in the proximity of the bomb; but the fallout would kill additional hundreds of thousands hundreds of miles away.

That is why we do not find the Pentagon and the administration talking about another scientific fact that they are ignoring. They cannot give the American people these facts and receive support for their fear propaganda. All this talk about dropping nuclear bombs and the hydrogen bomb in North Vietnam and in China—that is what the hydrogen bomb boys want to do, but they forget to tell the American people that if they drop them over there, hundreds of thousands of Americans will die in the United States, as far east as Chicago, from the fallout of the bombs we drop in Asia. That is easily seen, if we familiarize ourselves with the force and direction of the prevailing winds.

I am simply at a loss to understand how my country could get itself into the plight that it is in, and that there could be loose in this country supporters of this war, doing the bidding of the industrial-military complex that is taking over the policies of the Republic. The American people desperately need to recognize, before it is too late, that we are being run, in this country today, by an industrial-military complex that makes its profits out of American blood, and jeopardizes all the future generations of American boys and girls. I do not know how we can get the American people to recognize these facts before it is too late.

That is why I stand firm on every word I spoke on Friday, and apply every word I said then to the Senator's speech this morning. I can only say, the Senator is completely right. I do not intend for any of the blood of this war to be on my hands, and therefore I shall continue to fight in opposition to American continuation of a war in Southeast Asia in which we never should have involved ourselves in the first place, and in which we should not continue to involve ourselves.

It is time for us to stop making war in Southeast Asia and to insist that other nations of the world, which, as a Washington Post article this morning points out, are becoming scared to death of us—and they have every reason to be afraid of us, because we are following a military course of action that is jeopardizing the peace of the entire world—come in and settle this war for us. Apparently we cannot settle it. All we seem able to do is kill enough people and destroy enough property until we can hope to force a surrender. Even if we succeed, that will give us no peace; only a truce, endangering the lives of millions of American boys and girls in future generations as the world organizes against us, during the next century, to destroy us, if we do not stop this mad expectation of the United States to militarily dominate the world.

I am proud to associate myself with the speech of the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend from Oregon for his comments, and welcome his support.

(The following colloquy between Senator CLARK and Senator NELSON, which occurred during the delivery of Senator CLARK's address, is presented at this

point in the RECORD by unanimous consent.)

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I left the Presiding Officer's chair momentarily to come to my desk to commend the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] for his very thoughtful remarks about the thin ABM system.

The Senator has always had the courage to express forthrightly his views on any issue, no matter how controversial.

Mr. CLARK. Let me interject there to say that I thank the Senator for his kind remarks but, in my opinion, my statement requires no courage at all. I think it is good policy, in addition to being right, I intend to campaign on this issue, if I should run again next year, and I am confident that the majority of the people of Pennsylvania will agree with me.

Mr. NELSON. I am also confident that the Senator is correct. What astonishes me is the lack of opposition in Congress to the launching of this program which will provide a thin ABM system, which was described by one of my distinguished colleagues in the Senate, Mr. CHURCH, as the most expensive sieve ever constructed.

Mr. CLARK. I have often wondered whether we in the Senate are not more terrified of the Joint Chiefs of Staff than the Vietcong.

Mr. NELSON. It frightens me, too, when I consider the kind of judgment they have exercised in advising us on our intervention in Vietnam. In any event, I think, tragically, this is the first step down the road to the construction of what they are now saying will be a \$40 billion ABM system, if we construct the most expensive and sophisticated one we can think of—and, of course we will; and that anti-ballistic missile system will not be any more effective, in my judgment, than the thin ABM will be.

Mr. CLARK. I am sure the Senator is correct.

Mr. NELSON. I conclude by saying that I commend the Senator for his thoughtful statement. At a later date I shall make a further statement on this matter on the Senate floor.

Mr. CLARK. At which point, in the best tradition of senatorial courtesy, I shall come over and agree with the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. NELSON. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I must say that I find considerable merit and food for thought in the argument that an antiballistic missile defense system, while perhaps adding to a degree to our national security, could also have the paradoxical effect of making us feel overly secure. This is a crucial consideration, because it bears on one of the most elemental problems of the nuclear age; namely, that of maintaining restraint, both in the public at large, and within the Government. If we had not exercised supreme restraint at the time of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962—which is the only true nuclear showdown the world has yet seen—we might have descended then and there to the Armageddon that would have erased vast portions of civilization as we know it from

the earth. My fear is that the ABM may in some subtle way erode our restraint and permit our military leaders—and the public, too—to have a kind of unjustified overconfidence which will allow them to take greater risks and press stronger nuclear threats, on the mistaken and tragic assumption that we can afford to inflict astronomical damage because at least some of the retaliation will be diminished.

I recognize, of course, that another vital factor of the nuclear age is involved here, and that is our credibility. Our adversaries may be more inclined to take threats more seriously if they know that we have at least minimal protection against their retaliation. And it may be that for this reason we must reluctantly acquiesce in this latest increment to the arms race. But it seems to me that we must do so with the greatest caution and deliberation, remembering at every step of the way that nuclear defense does not in any way absolve us from awesome responsibility and restraint.

It must also be remembered that hostile nuclear missiles can be put in position in the United States by stealth and by trick, as well as by rocketry, and that the most sophisticated antiballistic missile system might in some circumstances be of no use whatsoever. In this regard, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD an article by the sagacious and distinguished columnist, Stewart Alsop, in the current Saturday Evening Post.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BUT IF 25 TRUCKS FANNED OUT

(By Stewart Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—The following exchange between Sen. Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island and Gen. Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is excerpted from the record of a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. The subject of their conversation was a grim one—the planting of nuclear bombs in American cities by stealth.

"Senator PELL. Is it not conceivable that missiles could be planted within our cities... no matter how good our antiballistic-missile screen was?"

"General WHEELER. This is a possibility... (deleted)."

"Senator PELL. But if twenty-five trucks fanned out over the United States they could do the same job and negate the most excellent ABM device, could they not?"

"General WHEELER. If they could get the devices into the country, assemble them and fan them out, the answer is yes."

This colloquy has inspired the following experiment in science fiction:

From a document marked *London, Most Secret, Eyes Alone; From M16 for PM, FS, and M only*:

The records we have been enabled to obtain indicate that neither the Hertz nor the Avis auto-rental companies had the slightest suspicion that the American-International Shrimp Corporation was anything other than an authentic business concern. At the request of the corporation, Hertz therefore unhesitatingly delivered 13 refrigerated lorries to a dock in the vicinity of Port Isabel, Tex., while Avis supplied 12 lorries to the shrimp corporation's representative, at the unloading platform on the Caloosahatchee River, near Fort Myers, Fla.

According to a reconstruction of the event by our agents, 13 heavy containers smelling strongly of shrimp were hoisted aboard the Hertz lorries from three shrimp boats. The

Avis lorries were similarly loaded from two shrimp boats tied up in the Caloosahatchee River. The loading of all 25 lorries was completed between 2 and 3 A.M. on July 11, 1971.

The lorries thereafter fanned out over the then excellent U.S. highway system, the Hertz lorries heading for Chicago and points West, whilst the Avis lorries sped toward the 12 largest Eastern cities. Only one lorry failed to reach its destination.

We have obtained a still legible copy of the Washington Evening Star of July 12, 1971, which on page 2 reports a "mysterious explosion of a refrigerated truck" 110 miles south of Pittsburgh, Pa. The explosion apparently killed the driver and two policemen. Presumably the police had, for some reason, stopped the vehicle and begun to investigate its contents, thus triggering a "dead-man" fuse. In any case, alone of the major Eastern cities, Pittsburgh survived physically intact, although the majority of its citizens subsequently succumbed to the heavy fallout from Cleveland.

The driver-agents (who were doubtless unaware of the contents of their lorries) must have been exceedingly well briefed, for all the remaining 24 lorries arrived at their assigned destinations 36 hours after the start, give or take a half hour or so. It has been established from blast patterns that the Avis lorry in Washington was parked near the intersection of 16th and K streets, a few blocks from the White House, while the Hertz lorry in Chicago was parked a block from the Tribune Tower. Other locations were chosen with similar care.

The timing devices must have been extremely accurate, for all 24 explosions occurred within less than a minute of each other.

M16 has been able to obtain a portion of the tape recording of the final conversation between the general commanding the Strategic Air Force, in his underground command post near Omaha, Nebr., and the commanding general of North American Air Defense, in a cave in Colorado:

"SAC: No word from the Classified Locations, General?"

"NORAD: Not a word, General. Congress was in session and the President was in the White House. The Vice President had the Second Satchel, but he must have got it too."

"SAC: Then I guess it's up to us."

"NORAD: Yes. . . . Must have been the Russians, of course. Funny we got nothing on the radar—never did trust that goddamn radar."

"SAC: Anything from Nudets?"

"NORAD: Nudets estimates fatalities in the eighty million range. Only preliminary, of course."

"SAC: I guess we've got to go. You concur?"

"NORAD: I concur. Over and out."

Within 28 minutes the first missile in the U.S. salvo exploded on its programmed target in the U.S.S.R. The salvo delivered 400 megatons on Soviet targets, the megatonnage calculated by the Pentagon's cost-effectiveness analysts as the minimum required to destroy the Soviet Union as a functioning society. The Soviet counter-salvo, on top of the great damage already done, achieved the same purpose in the United States. Several of the larger American cities suffered the ignominy of being destroyed twice over.

In the opinion of M16 there is no question that the American-International Shrimp Corporation was the cover name for an elaborate Chinese Communist operation. Although Fidel Castro hotly denied it before he died of fallout from the mainland, there is little doubt that there was some element of Cuban collusion—the shrimp boats certainly embarked from Havana.

In his 78th year at the time, the late Mao Tse-tung was near death and unquestion-

* Nudets: Nuclear Detection and Reporting System currently being employed in more than 50 U.S. cities.

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ably mad. But in destroying at one stroke both the hated "modern revisionists" and the "American imperialists" Mao surely displayed a certain genius in his madness. He was doubtless acting according to one of his favorite precepts, from Sun Tzu's *Art of War*: "Make a Noise in the East, Attack in the West."

The Chinese, of course have never acknowledged their role in the catastrophe, which utterly destroyed the world's two greatest powers. Given the unchallenged global domination of the People's Republic of China today, the Chinese role, on orders of the PM, may only be mentioned in a Most Secret document, such as this one—Destroy on Reading.

This little nightmare is not, of course, a prediction of things to come. And yet, as the colloquy between Senator Pell and General Wheeler indicates, there is no purely technical reason why something of the sort might not take place. According to the intelligence estimates, by the early 1970's the Chinese Communist intercontinental missile capability will still be rudimentary, but the Chinese by then should have been able to stockpile a considerable number of multi-megaton thermonuclear devices. A three-megaton device should weigh on the order of one ton, and could easily be carried in a truck.

We Americans harbor a stubborn illusion that everybody else must do it our way—because we depend on an elaborate and immensely costly missile system to deliver nuclear warheads, we assume that every other country must do likewise. The above nightmare may serve as a reminder that there are more ways than one to skin a cat—or kill a country. Finally, it may also be worth noting that most U.S. intelligence experts believe that the senile genius, Mao Tse-tung, is already, to a degree which cannot be precisely determined, insane.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transaction of routine morning business.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States submitting a nomination was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Geisler, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting the nomination of Asher E. Schroeder, of Maquoketa, Iowa, to be U.S. attorney for the northern district of Iowa, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

CORRECTION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE CANAL ZONE CODE

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate a letter from the Secretary, Panama Canal Company, Washington, D.C., transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to correct and improve the Canal Zone Code, and for other purposes, which, with the accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDING OFFICER:

Petitions adopted by the City Councils of the City of Oroville, and the city of Breau, both in the State of California, favoring the enactment of some form of a Federal tax-sharing program; to the Committee on Finance.

A petition signed by members of the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, of the State of Minnesota, relative to the provision of jobs, housing, and education to solve the problems of American cities; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

A resolution adopted by the Robert B. Elliott Law Club, of Columbus, Ohio, commending the President and the Senate for the nomination and confirmation of the Honorable Thurgood Marshall to the U.S. Supreme Court; ordered to lie on the table.

REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

The following reports of a committee were submitted:

By Mr. PROXMIRE, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, with amendments:

S. 1084. A bill to permit Federal employees to purchase shares of Federal or State-chartered credit unions through voluntary payroll allotment (Rept. No. 590); and

S. 1085. A bill to amend the Federal Credit Union Act to modernize the loan, investment, dividend, and reserve provisions; to require the establishment of an education committee; and for other purposes (Rept. No. 591).

RESOLUTION

TO PRINT ADDITIONAL COPIES OF HEARINGS ON THE "COSTS AND DELIVERY OF HEALTH SERVICES TO OLDER AMERICANS"

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia (for Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey) submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 174); which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration:

S. RES. 174

Resolved, That there be printed for the use of the Special Committee on Aging two thousand additional copies of its hearings of the Ninetieth Congress, first session, entitled "Costs and Delivery of Health Services to Older Americans."

SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 386

Mr. RIBICOFF submitted amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to the bill (H.R. 12080) to amend the So-

cial Security Act to provide an increase in benefits under the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance system, to provide benefits for additional categories of individuals, to improve the public assistance program and programs relating to the welfare and health of children, and for other purposes, which were referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 387 THROUGH 390

Mr. FONG submitted four amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 12080, supra, which were referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed.

AMENDMENTS NOS. 391 THROUGH 392

Mr. METCALF submitted two amendments, intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 12080, supra, which were referred to the Committee on Finance and ordered to be printed.

THE NEED TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS TO FIGHT WATER POLLUTION—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 393

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I am submitting an amendment to the Public Works appropriations bill to appropriate the full \$450 million which the Congress unanimously authorized last year for Federal grants for the construction of waste treatment works.

In passing the Clean Waters Restoration Act of 1966, the Congress made a firm commitment to the American people to help in the battle against the pollution of our Nation's lakes and rivers. This is no time to back down from that commitment.

Our budget is strained by the rising costs of the war in Vietnam and it is apparent that there will have to be some budget cuts made. However, it does seem to me to be false economy to cut back on this important program.

Last year it was estimated that \$3.5 billion was needed over the next 5 years for the Federal Government to meet its share of the responsibility for the costs of construction works. Section 8 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was amended by the Clean Waters Restoration Act of 1966 to authorize appropriations of \$150 million for fiscal 1967, \$450 million for fiscal 1968, \$700 million for fiscal 1969, \$1 billion for fiscal 1970, and \$1.2 billion for fiscal 1971.

Because the Congress authorized \$450 million for fiscal 1968 for the construction of sewage treatment works, many State and local governments went ahead with their planning for pollution abatement based on that authorization. Many municipalities have already passed bond issues in order to provide their share of the costs.

Our programs to abate the disastrous pollution of our waters are just picking up momentum and now is not the time for the Federal Government to renege on its promises. To withhold funds now will cost us much more in the long run.

There are numerous examples of the need for more Federal money. I will not

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cite them all but I would like to mention just a few.

For the six New England States, the total cost of their pollution abatement program has been estimated at about \$1.1 billion. Further, it has been estimated that those States will need about \$61 million in Federal grants in fiscal 1968 to keep up their programs. With the full \$450 million appropriation, they would receive only \$28 million, while with the proposed \$225 million, they would receive only about \$14 million.

Under the full \$450 million appropriation, the State of New Jersey would be eligible for about \$14 million in Federal funds in fiscal 1968. If the appropriation is cut to \$225 million, New Jersey would receive about \$5.7 million. At the present time, there are 32 construction projects pending at the State, local, and Federal levels for New Jersey. These projects have a total construction cost of \$35.9 million, of which the Federal share would be about \$10.1 million.

In Wisconsin there are currently 71 applications pending for Federal grants-in-aid, with a total cost of \$45.5 million. If these projects were approved and the Federal Government were willing to pay 30 percent, the Federal share for Wisconsin alone would be \$13.7 million. If the State were willing to pay 25 percent and if the State's water quality standards were approved, then the Federal share would be 50 percent, or \$22.8 million. Under the proposed \$225 million appropriation, Wisconsin would receive about \$4.5 million. Quite obviously, this is not enough.

As of July 31, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration was processing 153 projects which contained requests for Federal grants totaling \$43.5 million. At the same time there are 829 projects being considered in State agencies and an additional 823 projects in preparation. These 1,652 projects would require about \$910 million in Federal grants.

I have prepared a list comparing Federal money available and projected needs of 21 States and the District of Columbia for 1968. Total money available for these States is \$125 million while their needs total \$404 million. Even if the full \$450 million were to be appropriated, not all of these needs could be met. I would like to have this table made a part of the RECORD.

I have some detailed information on the State of Wisconsin including a list of the cities who have applications for Federal grants-in-aid and a letter from Gov. Warren Knowles to Secretary Udall which describes in some detail the problem that Wisconsin faces if the full authorization is not appropriated. I would like both of these items made a part of the RECORD.

The problem of water pollution in this country is enormous and at the present time we are fighting a losing battle. Unless the Federal Government is willing to meet its commitments and carry its share of the load, the tide of pollution which is sweeping the country will never be stemmed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be received, printed, and lie on the table; and, without objection, the material will be printed in the RECORD.

The material presented by Mr. NELSON is as follows:

REQUESTS FROM SELECTED STATES FOR FEDERAL GRANTS-IN-AID FOR SEWAGE CONSTRUCTION WORKS AS COMPARED TO MONEY AVAILABLE FOR THOSE STATES

State	Money for fiscal 1968 ¹	Money needed (in fiscal year 1968)
Alaska	\$883,000	\$1,663,600
Arkansas	3,692,541	5,000,000
District of Columbia	1,226,250	4,300,000
Indiana	4,985,658	15,900,000
Maryland	5,268,380	20,700,000
Massachusetts	6,260,078	20,000,000
Michigan	7,622,632	14,000,000
Minnesota	5,255,246	10,000,000
Nevada	887,800	3,230,000
New Hampshire	1,786,825	3,500,000
New Jersey	6,133,316	14,000,000
New York	22,167,350	175,000,000
North Carolina	6,678,171	9,800,000
Ohio	9,796,211	27,000,000
Oregon	2,908,175	4,500,000
Pennsylvania	11,793,520	25,100,000
Rhode Island	1,756,764	2,900,000
Tennessee	6,056,436	12,295,000
Virginia	6,803,650	11,000,000
Washington	4,473,231	6,300,000
West Virginia	3,467,710	5,000,000
Wisconsin	5,019,267	22,800,000
Total	124,922,221	403,988,600

¹ Total available under proposed \$200,000,000 appropriation plus \$63,160,644 left over from fiscal 1967.
² 30 percent Federal share; all other figures are at 50 percent Federal share.

THE STATE OF WISCONSIN,
 EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
 Madison, August 17, 1967.

Mr. STEWART L. UDALL,
 U.S. Department of the Interior,
 Office of the Secretary,
 Washington, D.C.

DEAR SECRETARY UDALL: Several months ago, Wisconsin municipalities were required to file by August 1 their plans for sewage collection treatment facilities construction in the 1968 fiscal year. The purpose was to permit early assessment of the need for Federal matching funds in the current fiscal year.

Sixty-seven local governments have filed applications. Total construction costs represented in these applications are estimated to be in excess of \$46.2 million. It is conceivable (although not likely) that as much as one-third of the planned construction may not be under way by June 30, 1968. However, if \$30 million in projects prove eligible for Federal assistance, we must assume that these projects would be eligible for more than \$15 million in funds under Section 8 (b) (7) of P.L. 84-660. If all were to begin, the amount would exceed \$25 million.

Inasmuch as it would appear that less than \$5 million will be available to Wisconsin for these projects under the terms of the appropriation measure recently passed by the House of Representatives, I would appreciate your counsel as to our future course of action.

We are already using the reimbursement provisions of the Act, under which a community builds now and hopes to be reimbursed later and, in FY 1967, persuaded our communities to accept one-third of the total Federal grant for which they were eligible. We did this so that we could begin more projects with the limited funds then available.

We are well aware of the escalating costs of the war in Viet Nam, which have been cited as justification for the failure of the

President to request the funds authorized by Section 8(d) of P.L. 84-660. Since the costs of the war show no sign of receding, it does not seem prudent for the State of Wisconsin to advise communities to accept partial grants or proceed in the expectation that Federal funds will ever be appropriated to match the purposes of the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966.

Wisconsin and her cities will undoubtedly do their share to preserve and enhance the quality of Wisconsin's water but what assurance can you give that the brave words of the Clean Water Restoration Act will be matched by the Federal dollars of assistance that the Act promised? And when?

My query is serious, practical and immediate. Wisconsin has decisions to make.

Sincerely,

WARREN P. KNOWLES,
 GOV. of WIS.

WISCONSIN—CURRENT APPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID

Name	Project No.	Estimated cost
Barron	179	\$764,462
Do	343	238,587
Beaver Dam	348	152,000
Bloomer	345	164,430
Bonduel	328	148,400
Brookfield	334	6,495,000
Cable	221	45,000
Caddy V. La S.D.	266	208,600
Cameron	175	78,650
Casco	319	20,000
Chetek	120	105,579
Colby	346	245,400
Darien	299	139,000
Deer Park	269	67,000
De Forest	274	265,990
Dellon, T. S.D.	285	504,000
Edgar	323	174,265
Elcho	241	75,300
Fox River Heights S.D.	295	63,028
Genoa	278	70,828
Germanicwn	313	194,400
Gleason	240	87,792
Green Bay M.S.D.	293	115,000
Do	294	1,450,785
Greenfield, Tn. of (La Crosse County)	217	46,055
Janesville	349	4,564,100
Johnson Creek	230	272,359
Kendall	318	150,981
Kewaunee	325	189,950
Knapp	246	57,700
Lena	171	195,895
Menasha, Tn. S.D. No. 4	336	220,000
Menominee	344	320,000
Milwaukee M.S.D.	315	7,620,000
Milwaukee M.S. Comr. (County)	337	676,200
Do	338	4,075,600
Do	339	575,000
Do	340	920,000
Milwaukee M.S. Comr. (City)	341	1,437,500
Do	342	3,162,500
Mount Calvary	321	224,281
Mount Hope	84	75,658
Nekoosa	327	339,083
Neosho	264	146,852
North Freedom	282	85,400
North Park S.D.	331	74,800
North Colony and Training School	330	193,200
Oscoda	335	98,410
Pembine	248	79,945
Pewaukee	306	206,400
Plainfield	58	68,740
Platteville	324	580,200
Port Edwards	322	515,181
Potter S.D.	279	67,800
Rosholt	212	165,594
Rothschild	334	597,635
Salem, Tn. (Hooker Lake area)	309	267,640
Sauk County Hospital and Home	298	9,500
Scandinavia	329	83,467
Sheboygan County (Rocky Knoll Som. and Hospital)	332	85,953
Sheboygan County Hospital	304	65,600
South Wayne	284	96,110
Stevens Point	351	1,051,000
Sturgeon Bay	333	35,000
Thorp	181	135,530
Union Grove So. Colony	307	274,500
Upson	213	18,100
Wausau	350	2,702,160
West Racine County M.S.D.	308	347,000
Wild Rose	152	109,312
Williams Bay	347	300,000
Total (71 applications)		45,457,544